SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

CARL K. MAHONEY

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Social Evolution and the Development of Religion

BY

CARL K. MAHONEY

INTRODUCTION BY

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in Drew Theological Seminary

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TO MY WIFE

WHOSE PERSONAL INSPIRATION AND SYMPATHETIC HELPFULNESS MUST BE REGARDED AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY SUCCESS HER HUSBAND MAY ACHIEVE AS A MINISTER OF JESUS CHRIST.

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PREFACE

THE following pages are the results of a study of religion from the standpoint of social psychology. It is, therefore, clearly a subjective interpretation of religion. Much is said that is undeserved against the religious psychologist for devoting so little attention to the supernatural. An attack of this sort is due to an ignorance of the meaning of psychology or a thoughtless disregard of the scope belonging to it. The psychologist in the field of religion does not discuss the supernatural at length because it lies without his province. It lies in the realm of the theologian. The psychologist deals only with human nature, and when he discusses religion he is shut up to its human side. However, on this point, although I do not regard myself as entitled to be called a psychologist, I do not mind saying that I am what William James called himself, "a crass supernaturalist." But the fact has

nothing to do with the study of religion from the standpoint of psychology.

An effort has been made to be fair and clear. The author has tried, as far as possible, to use the empirical method of study, to find out whatever might be discovered rather than to search for support for theories and predispositions. An effort has also been made to avoid technical language.

The purpose of the study is to trace the relation between the development of society and the development of religion, that light may be thrown upon the relation of religious and social questions of the present time. It goes forward on the assumption that human life is continuous, carrying results from the past into the present and preparing a way for the future.

INTRODUCTION

For several hours a week through three seminary years I enjoyed classroom fellowship with the author. His intellectual acumen, his spiritual insight, his zealous love for whatsoever is true in the realm of religious thought and life early and growingly impressed me.

This, the first fruits of his pen, is a true introduction of him, one that disposes us to know him better. My introduction of a greatly beloved friend results in the introduction of myself. Nevertheless, I do so because I will not forego the honor of being known to his readers.

Sex, love, and family; hunger, economics, and money bulk large in life. Religion, like these, is profitable for the life that now is and alone is profitable for the life to come. Wherefore, then, do millions of living men comport themselves as though the reverse of this were true?

Thales' sage advice, "Know thyself,"

needs scholarly help for its fulfillment. Such help our author renders by skilfully exploring man's original nature and bringing forth clearly his spiritual potentialities. These disclose the dominant place religion has in human nature. This disclosure ought to inspire him "to thine own self be true"; that is, be religious, and thereby attain the highest and best in complete living.

Aglow with pleasure, nothing is more real to me than pleasure. Cast down, nothing is more real to me than sorrow. These and, indeed, all states of consciousness seem to be myself. I truly know what I experience and with confidence I tell.

From sight and touch—that is, from my own experience—I infer that which my hand grasps and my eyes see is paper. This inference is from an equation with known quantities and one unknown quantity and one only. Such equations are solvable.

A sense of guilt canceled and ineffable joy in its place is my experience. From this the known I proceed to find the cause x, the unknown. It is God.

We, however, are wont to start beyond

ourselves, which is to start with the unknown. Often we begin with stars, the nearest of which is three and one-half light years, and so proceed from the unknown to the unknown. *Sans* latitude, *sans* longitude, we go from nowhere to nowhere. We must begin nearer, yea, within ourselves, with our own experience, the known, and proceed to the unknown. Our author pursues this path, the psychological. Few there be now that travel it; ere long it will be populous with truth-seekers.

Brave is the author to enter the lair of sociological lions and discard some of their favorite findings. While, like the ant, he collects, like the spider he spins from within a thread of acknowledged textile strength for the warp of society; namely, gregariousness. Gregariousness is everywhere apparent in animate life, it is adumbrated in inanimate life, and is suggested by the stars which cluster in constellations. Extirpate gregariousness from man and he is dehumanized. In this basic of basic elements in man, religion is inextricably articulated. Religion is therefore a social factor.

INTRODUCTION

Society is composed of individuals. Ever and anon geniuses, prophets, spiritual seers have appeared. Some statistician has computed a totality of a thousand in civilized history. They see and hold aloft what they see; howbeit, the arm that holds the torch may become that of a martyr. The people seeing a great light grow discontent with shadows and, though laggardly yet surely, make for the brightness. Religious leaders thus act upon and through society.

It was a storm-tossed ship of Moravian passengers fearless in impending death that moved John Wesley to be the maker of Methodism. Society releases individual gifts and by its sanctions makes them a part of its life.

In a land of drought, gods must be rain gods. Migrating from the wilderness, its gods are superannuated; entering a land of milk and honey, rice and other harvest gods are adopted. Man cannot live by bread alone, nor can he live without it. In some form or other our God must "give us this day our daily bread." Deity is indissolubly linked with economic life.

INTRODUCTION

The God of the Kenites was a covenant maker. Defeat in war of his devotees was not his but their failure in being just, in being righteous. Spurred by self-inflicted calamities, they become more just, more righteous, and out of their ethical fullness clothe Deity with more righteousness and more justice until his throne is overlaid with righteousness and canopied with justice. Religion and ethics react each upon the other.

In a patriarchal form of government God is a Father. He would be a Mother in a matriarchate. Holy men of old in the time of monarchies wrote, *kingdom* of God. Writing in our day they would entitle it a democracy. Bellarmine, a Roman Catholic apologist, said that an aristocratic form of government was ideal, and Christ, the King, instituted it for his church; hence, the pope. The *Roman* Catholic Church, barnacled with paganism, is an example of a religious institution taking on the form of a contemporaneous government. Some of our Protestant denominations are autocratic in government. "Tekel," is the handwriting upon the

wall for them to read. The church in America to-morrow, like our government, will be democratic.

Functional psychology has broken down the middle walls of partition and shown ethics, economics, and government dwelling together in one room. They interpenetrate each other and form an organized continuum. They advance and recede as a unit. So has it been. History will not reverse in the future. True progress of one makes for all is a law to be heeded in every intelligent attempt to reconstruct society, or in any way to modify it. A religious advance means an upward pull for all.

The allied and associated nations fought for democracy and won. Rome began in a rule of patricians and ended in that of plebeians. The world has had democracy without being safe. Russia now has it and is unsafe. How can we reconstruct the world and make it not only safe for democracy, but also safe with it?

The religious aristocrats of Jesus's day crucified him. It was the common people who heard him gladly. All who labor and

are burdened—this embraces all—he bids come unto him and promises them rest. Even Thomas Paine conceded the morality he preached "was of the most benevolent kind; it has not been exceeded by any." The gospel of Jesus is Good News for all.

Labor should not envy capital and capital should not vex labor. Nor will they with Christ as their Master Spirit. For each, then, will look not first on his own interests and afterward upon the interests of the other, but each will look upon the interests of the other as he would upon his own.

A new estimate of man must become universally operative. The least as well as the greatest must be appraised God's child and man's brother. In perfect good faith all must be admitted into a society wherein if one suffers from sickness, from poverty, or what not, all bestir themselves to restore, to enrich, to better that one. Christ's rule, All for each and each for all, will consummate this.

Home must be a domicile with flowers as well as flour, with books as well as butter. It must conserve health and decency and

beauty and happiness. An altar therein to him transfigures a home and furnishes it with all that from which a nation's grandeur springs.

The family is extended by Christ to include all mankind. Faith widens this horizon to include those in heaven. Christ's world is large enough for the "big four" and its multiples not to tolerate, but to cooperate with and to appreciate one another. He makes kindness, justice, honor, and love to be the governing principles between nations, and so ends war. "Nations that knew not thee shall run unto thee because of the Lord thy God."

The work of reconstruction is to be effected by Christ's institution, the church. Because three fourths of the people are estranged from it is no reason for changing its name, but reason only for conforming it to its Founder's life and teachings.

The efficacy of the church lies mainly with the ministry. Their duty is to know aright and to do the same. To believe falsely and execute it is appallingly illustrated in the diabolical carnage wrought by the Germans

from August 1, 1914, to June 28, 1919. To believe aright and not do is but little better.

Preachers, of course, must shake hands, smile, raise Conference apportionments—and more. The crying need—loud enough to split the dome of heaven—is for preachers to know the great things of the Kingdom, life, man, and God, in terms of to-day. Then to practice their beliefs in their own lives and translate them into social deeds, that both they and society may be saved.

The pages that follow learnedly, clearly, and truthfully set forth basic principles. He who understands, accepts, and proceeds upon them will impart a larger knowledge of the world that is above him, give a truer interpretation of the world within him, and make effective strokes in transforming the world around him into one whose governments are righteous, whose industries are just, and whose social order is Christlike.

WILLIAM J. THOMPSON.

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN

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THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN

The place to start in any study is the place where you are. The people or things to deal with first are those that you know most about. Our sure world is the world of our own personal experience. However far we may go from our starting points out into the highways and byways, and even into the thickets, of dialectic, it is impossible to go from anywhere else than here or from any other time than now. Our very beginning is an experience, and any amount of progress that we may make is an experience. We may run ahead in our thinking. We may put forth hypotheses and make conjectures, but these are constructed out of the materials of past experience and their validity must be tested and confirmed by the experiences of the future. It seems wiser, therefore, to begin with conditions as we find them and work backward and forward from that starting-point.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND THE

This is a study of certain phases of the life of humanity. It will be better to take a view of the humanity that we have with us now before we seek to determine very much concerning the humanity that has gone before or the humanity that is yet to come.

Man, as we find him to-day, is a social being. He is very much at home under conditions of association. He has an affinity for his kind. We find humans in groups and in squads and in multitudes more often than we find them in isolation; and when we find them in isolation, that isolation is usually enforced. History is, of course, a history of humanity, and it is a history of an associated humanity. The most primitive peoples have their forms and conditions of association. MacDougall says, "Although opinions differ as to the form of primitive human society, some inclining to the view that it was a large, promiscuous horde, others, with more probability, regarding it as a comparatively small group of near-blood relatives, almost all anthropologists agree that man was to some extent gregarious in his habits; and

the strength of the instinct as it still exists in civilized men lends support to this view."[1] Giddings says, "All the remains of primitive men show that they lived as savages live now—in groups."[2]

There is a sort of intimation of the tendency to association in the subhuman world. Things of the same kind are more often found together as aggregates than as isolated specimens. Says Professor Giddings in the introductory chapter of his Elements of Sociology: "If we follow the windings of a stream through the meadows and notice the various weeds and wild flowers that grow on its banks, the insects that wing over its stagnant pools, and the birds that nest in the thickets along its borders, we quickly learn that it is unusual to find only one object in a given place. We are much more likely to come upon great masses of cowslips or violets, swarms of gnats, bands of butterflies, two or three dragon-flies darting about together, and pairs, or even flocks, of the same species of birds, than to encounter in-

[1] Social Psychology, p. 85, John W. Luce & Co., Publishers.

[2] Reprinted from Principles of Sociology, by Franklin H. Giddings, by permission of The Macmillan Company.

dividual specimens. In like manner if we extend our observations over wide regions in the same country, and then over the entire surface of the globe, we find that particular rock formations, soils, and mineral deposits are found together in certain areas, and not scattered in a haphazard way throughout the continents; and that species of plants and animals have their well-known habitats or haunts, or, as naturalists say, their areas of characterization."

I should say that, while these observations are not of any great scientific value, they are suggestive of a cosmic principle that makes itself manifest in the higher orders of being.

There is very little in the possession of the race that does not bear the stamp of social influence. Even the inventions that seem to be the results of the creative efforts of individual geniuses are suggested by social demands. Every work of art is the reflection of social life and a result of social development. Literature is nothing else than a reflection of the life of a people in their various relationships and connections.

Without social interaction there could be no high development of thought and language. There could be no high plane of morality or high type of religion. Social interaction is indelibly stamped upon the life of humanity.

It seems certain from all that we know of human nature, especially its constancy in fundamental characteristics, that men have never been content to live in isolation from their fellows. It is man's nature not to live alone. He must have association with his fellows. Of the normal man Professor James says in his Principles of Psychology: "To be alone is one of the greatest evils for him. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of torture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to adopt. To one long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint, or a human form in the distance, would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences." Men who have been traveling across the great white waste of the north have been so oppressed by the stillness and by loneliness that they have had to break forth in soliloquy, substi-

tuting the voice of self for that of companions. The sound of their own voice kept them from going mad. It is reported that where one or two miners have lived through the long winters of that north country in a lonely dugout, waiting for the winter to pass, they have been driven to madness by their isolation and homesickness for the crowd. Only the strongest natures can stand the strain. Hermits and anchorites could not stand the loneliness of their self-enforced isolation if they were not supported by an ideal which stubbornly sets itself the task of overcoming natural tendencies. Even so, some of them go insane from loneliness and others give up their vows and return to the society of their fellows, unable to meet the strenuous and unnatural demands of the solitary life.

Man loves the crowd. He seeks the multitude. Being one of a crowd seems to most people the one essential condition to recreation. People go and walk up and down the streets of the city for the joy of being in the crowd. The social tendency modifies all pleasure. The interest in a play will drop

and play out without a crowded house to see and hear. The interest in a baseball game is supported and intensified by the presence of the crowd. Very few men would stand out in the rain alone to watch a great game. There is something of the same element in churchgoing. People go partly because of the crowd, and the large crowd tends to produce and maintain interest. It affects favorably both the preacher and the congregation, and the small congregation will have a depressing effect.

The impulse to association is not always conducive to better conditions. It can be overworked, and thus fail to operate for the good of the human organism or for the good of society. It is one of the chief causes of the overpopulation of towns and cities. Men are not prompted to congregate in cities by purely economic and industrial considerations. They love the city. They seek the throngs. There are "downs and outs" in New York city, who sleep on park benches and get their food from bread lines, when they might go elsewhere and reach comparative prosperity; but they are under the spell

of a great city. They would feel unutterably lonely and miserable away from the hustle and bustle of the throngs. They would rather starve in the city than live prosperously elsewhere.

The mere formation of groups or crowds would not be association, but it is a condition of association. As soon as some sort of connection exists between the individuals of an aggregation we have association. Society carries the idea of interconnection, of mutual relationship. It would seem that humanity began with sufficient connection to constitute society. Blood relationship would be sufficient. The development of new relationships, the formation of institutions, customs, and laws, and the growing complexity therein, is social evolution. We also call it civilization. The observed tendency of the race is in the direction of civilization. Once in a while there is a slump, a temporary disintegration, a lapse in the direction of the primitive and simple; but the great central current of life flows in the direction of organization and complexity. There is a growing multiplicity of distinctions and new lines of

cleavage are constantly being formed. Some of these distinctions are arbitrary and either useless or a positive detriment to the race, as the caste system in India. Sooner or later such a system must come tumbling down. Only those systems that accord with the fundamental tendencies of human nature can permanently survive. It is safe to say that no system has yet fully accorded with those fundamental tendencies. A great many go down. The process of social evolution, or civilization, therefore, is a process of the formation and disintegration of systems. The natural and permanent elements are carried over into each succeeding system.

Just as in the subhuman world we found a sort of prophecy, so to speak, of human society, we also find in the whole process of evolution a sort of preliminary to the evolution in human society. The thought of struggle for the purpose of survival has been so emphasized in most of the discussions of the doctrine of evolution in the past that evolution has come for many minds to stand for the struggle for individual survival. But it has come to be recognized that too much has

been made of struggle in the evolutionary process. Professor F. H. Giddings says in this connection: "The conception of nature as red in tooth and claw is very dear to moralists and politicians, but, unhappily, moralists and politicians do not know nature intimately. A world of living creatures that fear and hate, shun and attack one another without restraint, is not a fact of observation. It is a pure *a priori* creation of pure reason" (Reprinted from Principles of Sociology, p. 79, by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers).

Professor Hobhouse contends that, if evolution means progress, there is a stage when the process leaves off struggle and destruction and passes into cooperation and mutual modification of character. He says:

"In the lower stages rivalry appears as contributory to the development of successful types. Hence the view that natural selection is the cause of progress. If this were true, progress must be a self-defeating process, because the struggle for existence on which natural selection depends is the negation of harmony. The truth is that har-

mony always involves some selection, but not a selection determined by the law of force; not necessarily a selection involving the destruction of any other members of the species, but only a modification of their character.

"I have put it that rivalry 'appears' contributory to progress in the lowest stages. Is it only appearance? I confess to thinking a more radical view preferable. According to this view progress at any stage depends (*a*) on variations due at the bottom of the living being in the lower stages to maintain, in higher to extend and perfect itself, (*b*) on the suitability of resultant variations to conditions. It is this relation of variation to conditions that we have constantly used as the explanation of reflex, instinct, sentiment, custom, and so forth. Thus, it is not the extinction of other types, but the suitability of the higher type at each point which is the condition of its advance. At most the elimination of the lower would be an indispensable condition as long as the food supply is insufficient for both."[1]

[1] Reprinted from Development of Purpose, p. 285, by F. T. Hobhouse, by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

This is a very convincing argument. It brings forth facts and evidences that are frequently overlooked. It shows that the associating tendency has been operating, along with other cosmic forces, in the direction of a complete and perfect harmony, which represents the supreme purpose operating in all evolution. Social evolution is a continuation of the process. This view, of course, rests upon a philosophy which holds to both a progressive evolution and a constructive teleology. It seems to square with the teaching of Professor Giddings concerning the social nature of animals. It points toward such a widening modification of the gregarious nature of the types of animal life in their highest stages of development, even the human stage of one particular line of development, that not only will destruction from the struggle of existence be finally eliminated, but an ideal cooperation will be attained. This would be a glorious outcome for the process.

After we have gone back and forth in our study of mankind, seeing civilized man in the midst of the activities of life, gleaning from

the records of the greatest antiquity all we can concerning the manner of life of man in his primitive condition, taking into consideration man's world all the while, inwrought as it is with social demand, and noting the trend of the evolutionary process as a whole, it is difficult to see how anyone can think of man apart from his social connections. And it is more amazing that a theory of life could be held that would look to the overthrow of all social systems as the highest ideal of existence. Such a theory certainly loses connection with life in the concrete and utterly overlooks one of life's aspects. When we come to consider in the next chapter the basis of association and come to see how essentially the associative impulse is a fundamental fact of life and how irresistibly it operates, we shall be all the more amazed that a theory which contemplates the disintegration of society could be held by thinking men.

On the other hand, care must be taken not to go too far in the direction in which we have been going. We must not lose sight of the individual and individualistic aspect of the evolution of life. If we can make a correla-

tion of these two aspects of life, we shall escape the fallacy of extremes that has vitiated so much of social philosophy. Examples of such a fallacy are the old organic theory which dominated Greek thought and the thought of Old Testament writers, the theory that regarded society as a sort of magnified man, and the social contract theory of Hobbes and Locke. A true theory must take account of the coordinate natural development of society and the individual.

CHAPTER II
FACTORS IN SOCIALIZATION

CHAPTER II

FACTORS IN SOCIALIZATION

The development of society is not a simple thing. The beginning of the process was comparatively simple, but before it had gone very far a multitude of various factors began to appear. As the process has continued one factor after another has been summoned from the reserve equipment of human nature and from the evolving world. As we study society now we find it an extremely complex affair. Things in this realm are wrapped about with a great deal of uncertainty. When we go into the study of it, it is like taking apart an intricate machine, to see how one part is related to another part, to find out what parts are the most likely to wear and where the most attention must be given for the care of the machine, and to discover where an improvement may be made in the construction of another machine of the same function or where new features may be

added. But in the case of the machine the parts are constant and their relations are constant, while in the case of the social process there is a continual development in which the parts are consilient factors that are constantly undergoing adjustment, inner and outer, and the whole is being enlarged by the introduction of new factors even while the examination is going on. Sociologists are gradually losing the attitude of cock-sureness and going more cautiously, even being willing to hold some conclusions as merely tentative hypotheses.

There has been a very large difference of opinion as to what is the basic factor in the associative process, the prime factor both in point of time and of causal efficiency. This would mean the force that would give rise to the simplest form of association and which would be carried over in the process to the most complex. It would not be the sole cause of highly developed social relations and conditions, but the sole cause of the very simplest form of association. It is the thing that caused the process to begin and one of the things that help to carry it forward.

Perhaps a question may arise here as to the value of a consideration of origins in such a study as this or concerning what use may be made of such a consideration. Care must be used to keep from drifting into a fallacy. Later on we hope to show the relation between the social process and the development of religion. Some of the factors are common and some of these enter in at an advanced stage of social development. Certain sociological principles that have a bearing upon the religious life arise in the development of the science of the subject, and the validity of these principles is not dependent upon either social or religious origins. An idea or a theory or a principle or a doctrine may be valid regardless of its origin. The doctrine of a future life might have a thorough validity even though it had its origin psychologically in a savage's dreams of departed friends. But it is not the task here to deal with the validity of sociological and psychological principles alone, but to make a study of related processes. This is a study of development, and an origin is a very important fact in a line of development.

We speak of origin in the sense of fundamental cause or basic factor from which the process has its start, whether it continues to depend upon it or not. It may be an abiding factor throughout the process. In biology this is usually so. Therefore we expect the basic factor in association to be carried throughout the process of social development as a fundamental constituent of the process. If we can identify it, we can possibly get an insight into the other factors of social evolution that we could not otherwise have, and we can probably the more clearly trace the connection of the growth of society with the growth of religion.

Professor Giddings makes the basis of association the "consciousness of kind." He states his position as follows:

"In its widest extension the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it next marks off species and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the more definite ethnical and political groupings, is the basis of class distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance,

of rules of intercourse, and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct toward those whom we feel to be like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from that toward others believed to be less like ourselves.

"Again, it is the consciousness of kind, and nothing else, which distinguishes conduct, as such, from purely economic, purely political, or purely religious conduct; for it is precisely the consciousness of kind that, in actual life, continually interferes with the theoretically perfect operation of the economic, the political, or religious motive. . . . In a word, it is about the consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, that all other motives organize themselves in the evolution of social choice, social volition or social policy. Therefore, to trace the operation of the consciousness of kind through all its social manifestations is to work out a complete subjective interpretation of society." [1]

Professor Parmelee, of the University of Missouri, calls this an intellectual theory of association, and it seems to the writer that he

[1] Reprinted from Principles of Sociology, p. 18, by F. H. Giddings, by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

is justified in so doing, on the ground of the plain statement of Giddings; for, while Giddings holds that the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate, he defines the consciousness of kind as "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself." Recognition is intellectual. It is discriminative mental activity.

That is going rather far. There is a time when an infant has no perceptive power. Its actions are prompted by nothing more than a biological tendency which is for the preservation of the organism. It makes no discriminations. Yet the child is animate beyond all questions. It is rather improbable that the ox of Damaraland, which MacDougall uses as an illustration of the working of gregariousness, decided that he was an ox and that the other oxen were like him and, therefore, he would go and mingle in the herd with them. He rather found himself drawn by an indefinable impulse to that herd. Whatever consciousness he had of those other oxen was incidental and an ac-

companiment to the impulse rather than causal thereto. MacDougall's view fits the facts much more satisfactorily. He says concerning the consciousness of kind: "If we would state more accurately the facts vaguely implied by this phrase, we must say that the gregarious impulse of any animal receives satisfaction only through the presence of animals similar to itself, and the closer the similarity the greater the satisfaction." [1] He further says, still speaking of the consciousness of kind: "It is merely one of the most highly developed of the cognitive processes through which the gregarious instinct may be brought into play. If this instinct were lacking to men, the most accurate recognition of personal likenesses and differences would fail to produce the effects attributed to 'consciousness of kind.'" This is a very conclusive and decisive refutation of the argument for an intellectual theory of association. The gregariousness theory will receive larger attention later. It is the theory that we purpose to defend in the process of this discussion.

[1] Social Psychology, p. 299, J. W. Luce & Co., Publishers.

The emotional theory of association regards the affectional nature as basic. It is a sort of shading off of the theory of the consciousness of kind, for feeling is a sort of consciousness, no matter how vague it may be. Adam Smith's "fellow feeling" doctrine is an illustration of this theory. It emphasizes the love of kind. Mere consciousness of kind does not seem to some thinkers a sufficient motive for abiding together and for the formation of social relationships. The love of kind would be a stronger motive. Or perhaps the fear of dangers outside the group would be sufficient. It is argued that these emotions do not have to originate on a rational plane but may exist prior to the recognition of any sort of likeness or difference. And it is quite probable that feeling is more primal and elemental than cognition. The reaction of the mental life as a whole might precede any discriminative reaction. An attitude might be taken and a reaction started toward association even before recognition of likeness and difference takes place. This theory is, therefore, doubtless nearer the truth than the intellectual theory.

But the question is not whether emotional attitudes in association precede recognition of likeness and difference, but whether there is anything else more primal and basic as a motive force in that one direction than either of these. Instinct is more basic, simpler, more elemental. There is association before there is either emotion or consciousness. There is a pull in certain directions that is no more than psychic tension. It is subrational, subemotional, subvolitional. As development proceds, it takes on an affectional tone and a conscious accompaniment and, among highly developed beings, becomes a voluntary matter; that is, it may become so. The instinct abides and may sweep away self-control or may manifest itself in consciousness as a vague, impelling "hankering."

Tarde, in his Laws of Imitation, argues for imitation as the basis of association. The formation of society, according to his view, follows the laws of resemblance and repetition. Not only that, but these laws are basic in the process. All associational activity follows the beginning made by some primitive actor. All social relations have grown

out of the copying of his actions. The impulse to copy is followed up by the impulse to repeat in action. And so an action might be crystallized into a convention and transmitted as a custom. To sum up the matter in one sentence, he says, "The unvarying characteristic of any social fact whatever is that it is imitative."

But the thing that Tarde constantly emphasizes is the building of relations. He does not give sufficient importance to the fact that must precede any other social connection whatsoever, the coming together of individuals. This is the essential condition of the operation of the imitative instinct. Without the operation of something more primal, the imitative instinct would have no chance to make its appearance.

It should be kept in mind that none of these psychological forces that have been mentioned are excluded entirely by the rejection of each in turn as the basic factor in social evolution by the process of elimination which we have been using in our study. The evidences are in favor of a special instinctive tendency that unites individuals into groups

and crowds and, finally, into a social body which we call society. A description of the working of the process of association in one of its simplest forms and at a very early stage will strengthen the belief that already has been pretty well established by the method of examination that we have been using. Mr. Francis Galton has given the classical description of the operation of gregariousness as a crude instinct in animal life. "Describing the South African ox in Damaraland, he says that he displays no affection for his fellows, and hardly seems to notice their existence, so long as he is among them; but if he becomes separated from the herd, he displays an extreme distress that will not let him rest until he succeeds in rejoining it, when he hastens to bury himself in the midst of it, seeking the closest possible contact with the bodies of his fellows. There we see working the gregarious instinct in all its simplicity, a mere uneasiness in isolation and satisfaction in being one of a herd." [1]

[1] William MacDougall, Social Psychology, p. 84, by permission of J. W. Luce & Co., Publishers.

Gregariousness may be defined as the herding instinct, or, better, it is the biological tendency which operates in causing living beings to form themselves into groups or companies. This grouping, at least in lower stages of development, follows closely the law of kind. Under certain conditions, however, it seems to overleap the chasm of kind.

The gregarious nature of animal life underlies the phenomena of "crowd psychology." It welds the individuals of a unit mass. It seems to take control of the crowd, or, rather, to put it into the condition in which some other impulse may drive it in a given direction or pell-mell. Where it is working perfectly all rationality goes by the board, all individual consciousness seems to be lost, and the crowd becomes a unit mass dominated by emotions that are under the irresistible sway of a blind impulse. Any emotion that strikes an individual will spread through the whole mass. This contagion is what causes stampedes in herds of cattle. It is one of the main characteristics of mob activity. In orderly crowds, come together for rational purposes, this instinct of gre-

gariousness is at work making a social organism of the crowd, helping them to a common mind and to common emotions. The importance for social evolution of this great tendency is fundamental. Without it there would be no social mind, no public opinion or public sentiment, no concerted movements of great masses toward ends that mean achievement for the common welfare, and which could only be attained in that way. For people to have a social consciousness, even in the present stage of intellectual and social development, they must be brought together in masses, which is the condition of an even stronger influence of this instinct.

Perhaps it ought not to fail of mention that every herd, or group, or gang, or mob, or crowd has a leader. He is at the center of the force of attraction that holds the crowd together. He is the leading spirit, as a rule, and in him the social emotions have the strongest play. This fact lies at the foundation of social leadership.

Not every movement toward the formation of a crowd is initiated by the gregarious

instinct, but it always comes into play in adding members after a nucleus is started at some point of interest.

Professor Parmelee questions the existence of a gregarious instinct. He feels that association was due to other instincts operating together to produce gregariousness. Chief of these he regards the parental instinct and the reproductive instinct. But these instincts fail to account for the herding tendency. They account for the family but not for the herd or horde. They do not account for the actions of the ox of Damaraland or for man's love of the crowd. He says he does not see what forces would have nursed a gregarious instinct before it had selective value. But that is a mere confession of ignorance on a point in biology. We must reason from facts of behavior back to causes, and not from structure or forces to facts of behavior.

Taking gregariousness as a biological tendency, without the technical definitions of instinct, it furnishes the best account of the phenomena that are common to all associations from that of the lowest of animal life

to that of the highest. It is present throughout. It works in harmony with other instincts and with external forces. It lies at the foundation of sociability, which is more complex in its nature. Sociability is the gregarious tendency carried to a high degree of development through interaction with other forces. It is the gregarious instinct educated. The fellow feeling, which Adam Smith has made the basic principle of association, is the emotional phase of sociability. Gregariousness is the great primal force which has brought men together and kept them together. Social practices, social customs, social laws, social organization, social institutions have developed by interaction.

But the question of origins is not the most important question. The basic factor in the development of society offers a key to the central tendency in social activity, but it does not give us a key to other tendencies which have arisen in the process and which make society a complex affair. The other factors in social evolution must be studied in their own place and for themselves. While they are not at the bottom, they are real, and they

help to determine the character of society. They really give it character.

"The consciousness of kind" is one of those factors. It has entered in after the social process has been started. Something more elemental than consciousness preceded it, but it came in later to modify and direct that something. Out of it have grown caste, or social stratification; social distinctions in matters of position, wealth, and family history; race distinctions, affinities, and antipathies; various brotherhoods, political organizations, and religious denominations. Professor Earp uses the term "social cleavage," by which he means the lines of difference that run through the masses of humanity. These lines may be hardened and made fast, as in the caste system, or they may exist in the framework of human relations, and individuals, by a modification of their own individual lives, may pass from one to the other. At any rate, they exist, and humanity finds them out through the consciousness of kind.

The consciousness of kind is the foundation of social conflict. Race prejudices and

class hatreds grow out of it. The task of society is to eliminate social conflict. This is a gradual process and must be worked out with the greatest patience. Some are working in the direction of enlarging the consciousness of kind. The aim is to fix attention on points of likeness in universal humanity and minimize the differences as they appear in consciousness. It would seem that this would be futile. The centering of consciousness is a difficult thing to control. The aim should be to bring humanity to a common level that would be real by a process which should gradually eliminate the differences. This should be done by lifting the general level and taking unfair social advantages away from those who hold them. Democracy is the hope of the world, but it must be the democracy of human character, a condition of human society where there can be a common mind.

We have noted Tarde's argument for imitation as the basis of association. Imitation certainly does play a large part in social development, but Professor E. A. Ross puts it in correlation with another factor that is

quite as real and important. He regards fashion as a compound social factor, having differentiation and imitation as subfactors. The instinct of differentiation, or individuation, works in the direction of new departures from the established conventions and types of existing things. It is the impulse to be different, to adopt a new course of action, to bring into existence new and different things. Imitation operates in the copying of new things and new ways.

Convention is the immediate social result of imitation. Professor Ross defines it as "the psychic resulting from the deliberate, noncompetitive, nonrational imitation of contemporaries. It is the social establishment of some fact or manner of the present for the present. The things we do because other people in general do them are the conventions. When a convention is transmitted from one generation to another it is called a custom. The act of transmission tends to solidification and permanency. There is a certain sanctity that enters in with age and works for perpetuity. Forms of belief and ways of thinking, when transmitted from one

generation to another are called traditions. When a custom has attained a sufficient permanency and acceptance by society, it becomes a law either by formal enactment or by common consent. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the importance of convention, custom, tradition, and law in social development. It is obvious. These have been mentioned in order that it may be seen that they are kept in mind and in order to put them in their proper relation to the subject under discussion. They were subordinate to and resultants of the instinctive tendencies of differentiation and imitation.

The differentiation tendency is the impulse behind the formation of new institutions, the rise of new opinions, the establishing of new conventions and customs. It is the seat of radicalism. New systems of belief and new social alignments have grown out of this tendency. New political parties and new religious denominations have their origin here. On the other hand, the imitative tendency tends to enlarge, solidify, and make permanent institutions that have been established. It spreads and socializes opin-

ion. It gives consistency and thoroughness to parties and denominations. It is the conservative factor in social development. Both of these tendencies are essential to social progress. Without them society could no longer exist and human life could not get on. The social problem is to properly correlate them.

Social development has reacted upon itself. Social interaction has brought increased mental development and that in turn has acted as a socializing factor. Discoveries and inventions have been the material results of intellectual progress and in turn have become important factors in social development. It is impossible to imagine or estimate the significance of the ocean steamship or the telephone in the making of modern society. Mental development has devised schemes of advancing itself, and institutions have been developed for that purpose. These are social institutions, and education is the most powerful and direct-acting influence in social development. After its entry into the process, social development proceeds on a rational basis. Sociology is the outgrowth

of educational development. Thus has the process become conscious.

While human intelligence has been going forward through social interaction until it has turned itself directly back upon the socializing process, there has also been developed a social mind. Professor Earp has very concisely defined the social mind as "a body of knowledge or ideas, that may be realized in conduct that has social values, and may be expressed in thoughts, feelings, or deeds. This body of knowledge may be possessed by an individual in society, or by a group in its relation to other groups or individuals, or by a nation at large, and ultimately by humanity as a whole."[1] This social mind, once it is clearly formed, carries humanity forward by rapid strides, sometimes by great leaps that leave us dazed and wondering, in the process of socialization.

The social mind is developed through the experience of the race. Questions that arise and situations that present themselves in the course of human evolution give rise to public opinion. Public opinion is the common

[1] The Social Engineer, p. 83.

thought of a people or a community upon a question at issue. Professor Giddings has called it "rational like-mindedness." It is the intelligence of the public directed toward some fact or question. It is the resultant of the fusing of the opinions of individual minds, the resultant of the judgments somehow shared by the individual minds of a group or people. It is what the public thinks about a thing. But it is impossible to have a deep social interest, and therefore a clearly formed social mind, without something stronger than mere public opinion. We need public sentiment. Public sentiment is the emotional attitude of the public toward a thing. It is how the public feels about a thing. There may be considerable public opinion without very much public sentiment. There may be a consensus of belief coupled with a bored indifference. There may be a strong public sentiment unsupported by an intelligent public opinion. Public sentiment in that case is mere social bias. The final need is the social will. It is the determination of the public upon a particular course of action. It is directive and impelling. As

steps are taken in action, new opinion and new sentiment are generated and society is encouraged to take new forward steps. Thus the process goes on.

We must not get a mythical idea of the social mind. It is not a thing in itself, independent of individual minds. It does not exist through any telepathic connections. It is a shared body of knowledge and a common bent or modification of individual minds. There is no great common, self-directive personal self-consciousness that we call the social mind, the mind or soul of society. Society is the outcome of a relating process and the social mind the result of the building of a system of relations in which individual minds can work together.

It would seem strange to speak of war as a factor in socialization. War represents social conflict, devastation, the destruction of the things that belong to civilization, the climax of discord. But one of the real facts of life is its abundance of paradox. War, in spite of its devastating effects, its breaking up of civilizations, its disorder, its destruction of life and property, has been a factor in

the process of socialization. In the more primitive times the very clash of clans has brought about the formation of alliances that have worked for larger units of society and more complex social organization. War has often been the factor that has determined what types of civilization and social order should dominate in the world's life. While the results of war have sometimes set back the hands of progress and hindered the advance of humanity in civilization, they have, on the other hand, meant the triumph of forces that were working for social progress. Something was said in the former chapter about the elimination of struggle from the evolutionary process, but it has not yet been entirely eliminated. Most of the achievements in social progress have been bought with the price of conflict and blood.

One of the most potent factors in the development of society is left for special consideration, because it is a part of the main subject. It is a socializing factor in the sense that it is a social binder, as the very meaning of the word would suggest, and because it is one of the deepest and most appealing inter-

ests of humanity. That is religion. Professor Rauschenbusch has written a very significant paragraph concerning the power of religion: "The power of religion is almost illimitable, but it is not necessarily beneficent. Religion intensifies whatever it touches, be it good or evil, just as electricity turns a magnet into an electro-magnet. There is no love so tender, no compassion so self-sacrificing, no courage so enduring, as the love and compassion and courage inspired by religion. But neither is any hatred so implacable or any cruelty so determined as religious hatred and cruelty, Mormon polygamy still persists in the face of law, public sentiment, and social evolution, because it is sanctioned by Mormon religion and theology. When we pray for more religion, let us pray for a religion that is dedicated to a better future and not to an evil past." [1]

With this suggestion, let us pass into the larger discussion of the relation of the development of religion to the development of society.

[1] Reprinted from Christianizing the Social Order, p. 34, by Walter Rauschenbusch, by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

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Religion is a matter of life. Whatever may be said concerning it that may be true or false, that may hold something uncertain or doubtful, this statement will always hold good. And any study of religion for the sake of getting at the history of its origin and development must be a study of human experience. The study undertaken here is a subjective study purely, made from the standpoint of social psychology. There is no attempt at offering an interpretation of religious development from the theological standpoint. But still it is true that all knowledge of religion must come through the medium of human experience. Revelation involves experience, and God can reveal himself no faster than man is able to receive the revelation. So, then, the development of re-

ligion rests fundamentally upon the development of human life. There is a great debate among psychologists of religion as to whether the social or individual life is basic in the religious consciousness and as to whether the religious consciousness arose in the development of the individual or the social consciousness.

Professor Ames says in his Psychology of Religious Experience (p. 33), "It is generally recognized that in primitive life religion was a matter of social custom." Upon this assumption he builds a theory of the social origin of religion. The statement quoted is true in one sense, but, when it is assumed upon this that religion had its origin in social custom and is a matter of social custom only, there is large room for difference of opinion.

Professor Ames defines the functional psychology as the psychology that views the mental life as an instrument of adaptation to environment.[1] This is true as far as it goes, but functional psychology is not shut up to the view that the mental life is merely

[1] Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 15, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Publishers.

an instrument of adaptation. What is it that is being adapted? Both the living being and the environment. The living being is a psycho-physical organism. The mental life is one of its aspects and the physical is another. The mental life is no more in the service of the physical than the physical is in the service of the mental. It is only in an accommodated sense that either can be called an instrument of adaptation. The observed results of the evolutionary process are the enrichment and growing complexity of the psycho-physical organism through interaction with the environment, and by means of the evolutionary impulse itself, and a growing harmony between the organism and the environment. Either phase of the psycho-physical life is functional in the sense that it is in the service of the evolutionary process. This process is engaged in the development of a more and more complex life and a more and more complete harmony of cosmic forces. Consciousness of a more and more advanced type is a characteristic of that life of a greater and greater complexity toward which the evolutionary process is moving.

Consciousness is not a mere instrument of adaptation or a mere outgrowth, a side issue, but it is an object of that adaptation, an enrichment of the life which is being developed. The religious consciousness is a phase of a more or less developed state of consciousness.

Professor Dewey says that consciousness expresses a combination of doing and undergoing. If we were simply doing beings, we should not be aware of our doings. If we were simply undergoing, or passive, beings, we should not be conscious. Consciousness implies action and reaction. It involves resistance. Professor Ames is in accord with this view. But he does not tell us how this is. This is all doubtless true, but it is only certain kinds of reaction between certain kinds of living beings that produce consciousness. The mere following out of certain physiological impulses will not account for the different phases of the conscious life which are incommensurate with and wholly unlike the phases of the conscious life that can be traced directly back to these impulses. There is a force in personality, and in the environment, which is more fundamental than

any of these things, and which brings about the conscious life through the different forms of interaction and determines the main directions which the conscious life shall take. This is the same force that operates in heredity, accounting for variations and new directions. "Some call it evolution and others call it God." But this is the door up to which a study of life from the subjective standpoint always finally leads us.

Professor Ames calls the functional psychology voluntaristic.[1] And Dr. Dewey holds that there is always an element of purpose in experience, an effort to pass from the Known to the unknown. Then, we may accept the methods of the modern functional psychology without being shut up to the view that religion is merely an outgrowth of social development. Professor Dewey's conclusion, just mentioned, may be taken as the starting-point of the religious consciousness, the constant tendency of experience to find the unknown, the tendency of personality to relate itself to the deeper reality. MacDougall speaks of the instincts as specific

[1] Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 17.

tendencies, and he finds in the human personality other more general tendencies which fit into empirical evidence in a most convincing way. These are the general or nonspecific tendencies arising out of the constitution of mind and the nature of mental processes in general, when mind and mental processes reach a certain degree of complexity in the course of mental evolution. May we not say that this futuristic tendency of experience, of which Professor Dewey speaks, is one of those general tendencies, and that it clearly manifests itself in the higher levels of conscious experience where inference is involved? Then, when the person begins to look for a deeper reality than that in his immediate and everyday world, when he comes to think of another order of life than that with which he is familiar, the religious consciousness is born. When man begins to live with regard to that sense of a deeper reality, we have religion. When he seeks to locate that reality, to define it, to discover the fundamentals of its nature and activity, we have philosophy.

It is at once evident that, while this view of

the origin of religion contradicts the theory that religion arose out of social practices, it also fails to establish the fact that there is a special religious instinct. The religious instinct has been a fond possession of defenders of the faith for generations. It deserves some attention, and right here is the logical place to consider it. The existence of a religious instinct would suggest a structural basis, and the attempt of physiological psychologists to locate a structural basis for religion has run into the ridiculous. The word "instinct," when thus applied, has usually been used in the sense of a special faculty. But modern psychology has for all time discredited the faculty hypothesis. The mind acts as a whole and all returns coming in bear out the fact. It ought to be instantly seen that the theory of the tendency of the whole organism toward a religious consciousness at a certain stage of the development of the life is more comprehensive in its claims for religion than the theory of the religious instinct. It involves the whole man in the exercise of religion. Religion is not merely intellectual or emo-

tional or volitional. It is all of these. Dr. Galloway, in his Philosophy of Religion (p. 77), gives expression to about the same idea that I have sought to set forth and indicates its wider implications. He says: "Reviewing the evidence, we shall have no difficulty, as it seems to me, in coming to the conclusion that man's whole psychical constitution is involved in his movement to religion. The desire for goods belongs to man's nature as an active being: and the sense of desire is inseparably linked with the sense of need and incompleteness, and with the feeling tone which goes with them. But neither the desire nor the feeling could in itself create the object through relation to which man finds religious satisfaction. This is given by belief; and even belief which is little more than an instinctive idea requires some cognitive activity which selects and holds the object before the mind. And without the superior intellection that distinguished man from the animals and made growth of language possible, it is safe to say that religion would not have come into being."[1] This seems to me to

[1] By permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, Publishers.

offer a convincing argument for the fact that religion is the result of the movement of man's whole psychical system in one direction, that direction being determined by the demand of an enlarging life and by the presence of an enlarging world. As Dr. Galloway further says, "We can at least say that man's consciousness of his insufficiency creates that longing for fellowship with a Reality beyond him through which religion is realized."

The arguments for the social origin of religion, while they acknowledge both a natural and a social environment, fail to take proper account of the former in relation to religious origins and development. This is why they fail to take account of the individualistic aspect of religion. They discuss social interaction at length, making it the basis of the religious life. They mention here and there the interaction of man with his physical environment and the great deeper Reality in the universe and seem to fail to see that herein lies the basis of the individual religious experience. Religion is due, not so much to man's interaction with his fellows, but the

interaction with his environment as a whole. The fact that he has had fellows with whom to share his personal experience, has given religion its social aspect.

What has been said in the foregoing paragraphs has aimed at showing that the social origin of religion is not a necessary assumption of the functional psychology, and that the origin of religion is no more social than individual in its nature. Religion is a fact of the evolution of the human personality, and is both individual and social in its nature. It is just as proper and as logical to speak of the religious aspect of social development as it is to speak of the social aspect of religious development. Society may just as truly be spoken of as religious as religion may be spoken of as social. As to origins, socialization goes back to the gregarious tendency, and religion has its foundation in the tendency of the organism to relate itself to the highest reality.

The social theory of the origin of religion is recent. The more established theories are rather individualistic. Before we leave the question of origins it will be well to briefly

examine some of these conclusions. They have a bearing upon the whole development of religion. Mr. Andrew Lang begins his book on The Making of Religion[1] with a very pertinent statement for our present line of consideration. He says:

"The modern Science of the History of Religion has attained conclusions which already possess an air of being firmly established. These conclusions may be briefly stated thus: Man derived the conception of 'spirit' or 'soul' from his reflections on the phenomena of sleep, dreams, death, shadow, and from the experiences of trance and hallucination. Worshiping first the departed souls of his kindred, man later extended the doctrine of spiritual beings in many directions. Ghosts, or other spiritual existences fashioned on the same lines, prospered until they became gods. Finally, as the result of a variety of processes, one of these gods became supreme, and, at last, was regarded as the only God. Meanwhile man retained his belief in the existence of his own soul, surviving after the death of the body, and so

[1] Permission of Longmans, Green & Co., Publishers.

reached the conception of immortality. Thus the ideas of God and the soul are the result of early fallacious reasonings about misunderstood experiences.

"It may seem almost wanton to suggest the desirableness of revising a system at once so simple, so logical, and apparently so well bottomed on facts. But there can never be any real harm from studying masses of evidence from fresh points of view."

Mr. Lang then proceeds to examine masses of evidence and to show from these that the high gods of primitive religions are conceptions that have had no connection with the animistic beliefs of primitive peoples. He shows that these conceptions are direct developments from a vague general sense of the supernatural. The idea of God is not a secondary but a primary idea. He sums up his conclusion as follows: "God cannot be a reflection from human kings where there have been no kings; nor a president elected out of a polytheistic society of gods where there is as yet no polytheism; nor an ideal first ancestor where men do not worship their ancestors; while, again, the spirit of a man

who died, whether real or ideal, does not answer to a common savage conception of the Creator. All this will become much more obvious as we study in detail the highest gods of the lowest races."

In his essay on "Pre-Animistic Religion" R. R. Marett sustains the contention of Mr. Lang. Without going into the mass of evidence which Marett brings to support his argument, his book being a recent publication and fully accessible, the statement of his argument at the beginning of the essay will be sufficient for our purpose and will doubtless be so convincing that there will be little inclination to call it in question. It is as follows:

"Anthropology needs a wider exterior definition of rudimentary religion. Tylor's animism is too narrow, because too intellectualistic. Psychologically, religion involves more than thought, namely, feeling and will, as well; and may manifest itself on its emotional side, even when ideation is vague. The question, then, is whether, apart from ideas of spirit, ghost, soul, and the like, and before such ideas have become dominant

factors in the constituent of experience, a rudimentary religion can exist. It will suffice to prove that supernaturalism, the attitude of mind dictated by awe of the mysterious, which provides religion with its raw material, may exist apart from animism, and, further, may provide a basis on which an animistic doctrine is subsequently constructed. Objects toward which awe is felt may be termed powers. Of such powers spirits constitute but a single class amongst many; though, being powers in their own right, they furnish a type to which the rest may become assimilated in the long run. Startling manifestations of nature are treated as powers without the agency of spirits being necessarily assumed. Even when they are regarded as living beings, such animism falls short of animism in Tylor's sense, that is, a view which distinguishes between a spirit and its vehicle, and holds the animating principle to be more or less independent and separable. Out of that awe-inspiring thing, the bull-roarer, certain Australian supreme beings would seem to have developed, who came to be conceived as

supernatural headmen, but not as spirits. Curious stones are apt to rank as powers, and even as alive, but it is a long step from a vague belief in their luckiness to the theory that they have 'eaten ghost.' Animals are often accounted powers, for instance, if associated with mystic rites, as in totemism, or if of uncanny appearance; but animistic interpretations may supervene, as when the wearing of tooth and claw is taken to imply an attendant animal spirit, or when ancestral spirits are thought to be incarnated in animals. Human remains seem to have mystic efficacy in themselves, the dead as such inspiring awe; though here we are near the fountain head of animism, namely awe of the human ghost, which hence is especially liable to be called in to explain the efficacy of the 'dead hand,' and so on. Of diseases, some invite an animistic theory of causation more readily than others, which are simply put down to the powers set in motion by witchcraft. Blood, and notably the blood of women, is a power in its own account, and not because of any associated spirit. These examples are enough to show that something

wider than animism is needed as a minimum definition of religion." [1]

The psychologist and anthropologist of a certain type have been busy seeking to discredit modern beliefs in God because of the inferior character of their origin. While the origin of a belief has no final determinative power over its validity, it is significant that primitive men are being discovered not to have been so far wrong in their religious thinking, crude as it was, as they have been regarded as being.

The results of the studies of these distinguished men support the thesis of this chapter. Whether we reason from the assumptions of functional psychology or examine the empirical evidences as found in the condition of primitive peoples, we reach the same conclusion: that religion arises from the tendency of human organism to find and relate itself to the highest reality.

But the question of origins is not the most important question, after all. The relationship between the religious life and the social

[1] Reprinted from the Threshold of Religion, p. 2, by R. R. Marett, by permission of The Macmillan Co., Publishers.

life at the present time is the important thing. Leading up to this is the relation existing between religious development and social development.

The fact that men have been together in aggregations has led to the socialization of every aspect of life. The moral life, the economic life, the religious life have all become socialized and have developed largely through social interaction. We cannot say what the moral, economic or religious life might have been under other conditions than those of association. We can only say what it is under the conditions that have existed and that still exist. But these conditions explain how it is that religious practices, religious institutions, religious aims and ideals, religious life in general, must be social. If religion was not purely a social matter in its origin, it certainly has been social in its development and must continue so. Ceremony and worship are largely social in character. "Forsake not the assembling of yourselves together" is the watchword of all religions. They cannot live without the assembly. Religious beliefs,

emotions, and purposes would evaporate and perish from the earth unless they were given expression in organizations and institutions. They must become fixed in the life of society. Modifications of the idea of God have come largely through social interaction. The change of the name and idea of the Hebrew God as a result of the Jehovah-Baal conflict is an illustration. Exclusiveness in religion is a social matter. It is due to clannishness, close grouping, and segregation of peoples. Whatever may be said as to the priority of the "consciousness of kind" as a factor of association, it is certainly a factor of social development, and is nowhere more pronounced than in religion. The intermingling of peoples has brought about a widening of the consciousness of kind and a corresponding universalization of religion.

Dr. Galloway says concerning the relation of social and religious development: "We conclude, then, that religious belief, which represents the objective aspect of religious experience, is essentially dependent on the mediation of society. From the social whole it derives stability and continuity. As far

back as we can trace religion we find that, like language, it is a social heritage, and the single man does little or nothing in the way of invention or innovation. The religious relation develops, but in primitive society the process is so slow that it proceeds without observation." [1] Dr. Galloway calls the influence that works for a common belief the social factor in belief. The second factor of which he speaks, the constant expression of religious belief in religious acts, does not seem to me to be less a social factor than the other or to call for a distinction along this line. Religious acts are social in their very nature, and when religious belief is given expression it is done socially.

There is an extreme statement in the above quotation that must not be passed over without comment. It is the statement that "As far back as we can trace religion we find that, like language, religion is a social heritage, and the single man does little or nothing in the way of invention or innovation." This is an illustration of how a (really) great

[1] Philosophy of Religion, p. 87, Charles Scribner's Sons, Publishers.

thinker can forget himself and fall into one-sided statement. Religion is a social heritage, but not in the same sense that language is nor with the same degree of completeness. The comparison is unfortunate. The statement that the single man does little or nothing in the way of invention or innovation is simply not in accord with the facts. The history of the development of religious belief has been the history of the appearance of individuals whose personal beliefs were the new sources out of which subsequent social beliefs flowed on into the future. Out of the personal influence of Moses came the revision of the faith of Israel. Out of the personal life of Jesus of Nazareth came the Christian faith. Out of the personal influence and teaching of Mohammed flowed the creed of Islam. The influence of the powerful dominant personality of Luther was the power that welded the various opinions of individual Protestants into the social creed of Protestantism. Personality is the fountain and source of all great movements. The inventions and innovations of the single man have been the means of most of the religious progress in the

history of the world. It is true that these personalities are, to a certain degree, the products of social forces, but this does not denude them of their individuality. It is also true that a large part of their contributions to religious belief sprang fresh and new from their own inner personal experience. The fact of individuality and the influence of individual lives must never be lost sight of in an emphasis upon the social side of religion.

If it is proper in the consideration of origins to keep in mind the individualistic aspect of religion, it is equally proper to keep it in mind in the consideration of the development of religion. Religion is not wholly social either as to its origin or as to its development and inmost nature. A great deal has been said by various writers about the fusion of the individual consciousness with the group consciousness in primitive peoples and a growing individuation in the developing consciousness. As a matter of fact the consciousness of primitive man was exceedingly vague. There has been a growing clearness and distinctness both in self-consciousness and in social consciousness. They have

grown together. So with a larger socialization of religion comes a deeper and clearer personal religious experience.

So far we have considered the development of religion, socially and individually, in a general way. It is in order now to consider it briefly from the historical standpoint.

The preanimistic attitude of primitive peoples, the vague sense of the supernatural that they have, is infused throughout the group. There is such a thing as individual experience in this condition of the race, but it is less striking and less outstanding and rarer than in the more developed condition of society. Dr. Galloway regards this condition as prereligious. I cannot see any reason for so regarding it. Any sense of the supernatural is manifestly a religious matter. But however we may regard this stage of human development, it must be considered in a study of the development of religion.

Some of the more modern religious ideas came through the animistic stage of development. Others have had a line of development independent of animism. By animism is meant the belief of primitive man that

other objects than himself possessed souls, or spirits, like his own, that were capable of affecting the course of his life and that of his associates. We have already had Mr. Lang's statement of the classical theory of how the animistic belief came into existence. Animism has among most peoples passed into a more elaborate spiritism, the ultimate development being the supreme Spirit of the universe, where that idea has not come through another course of development.

Totemism represents a distinct advance in the development of a religious social consciousness. It is allied to ancestor worship and has some of the same social significance. "The totem is a species of animal, and occasionally a species of plant, whose life is conceived to be bound up with the life of the tribe, and to be closely linked with the well-being of the social whole. The totem, which in some cases is an individual animal, is the visible embodiment of the unity of the society, and its life is mysteriously connected with that of all the members of the group." [1]

[1] George Galloway, Philosophy of Religion, p. 96, Charles Scribner's Sons, Publishers.

The religion of the tribe was marked by exclusiveness, due to the narrow outlook and narrow range of interests of the tribe. The same weak causes developed small and selfish religious motives and circumscribed ideas of the Deity. The development of religion has all the while kept close pace with the development of society. As the social consciousness has enlarged the religious consciousness has enlarged. National religion followed tribal religion, bringing higher motives, less exclusiveness, and higher conceptions of God. When man reached the stage where he could think even a little in world terms, religion became universalized.

There has been throughout its development a steady moralization of religion, the moral element always being a mark of superiority and progress. But we must not fall into the error that the ethical element in religion is a recent development. It has been present from the very beginnings of religion. There is something in the simplest form of the religious attitude. And it is possible to find in the more advanced religious development of the modern day the ethical element

in the forms of religious worship and belief pushed into the background while the non-ethical is brought to the foreground. Still, the ethical development of religion has roughly paralleled its general development.

Since morality is developed largely by social interaction, the moral element in religion is a social product. This is another important tie between social evolution and the development of religion.

Let us, before closing this chapter, consider in the same way the individualistic aspect of the development of religion. There has never been a time in the history of the world when the totality of any individual life was swallowed up in the life of the social whole. Man lives in two worlds. He has always lived thus and always will. The first is the world of his own individuality. Into this world no other soul may come. There are experiences here that none may share. The other is the social world, where life is lived in common with his fellows. Consciousness has never been so dim or vague that these two worlds have not been distinct. Religion has from its beginning entered into

both worlds. No matter how dominant the social interests may have been, at least a fringe of individual religious experience has always been present.

In any condition of society that has ever existed there have always been outstanding personalities, dominant individual lives. These have influenced, even determined, the thought and activity of the group. Among these were the religious leaders. Their experience and their thought were matters of their own individual living and thinking. Their influence was social in its results but individual in its source, and must be reckoned among the individual factors in the development of religion as well as in the development of society. Among the most primitive tribes is the medicine man, or some religious dignitary with a like function. He mediates religion to the tribe, and usually does it out of his individual notions of religion, influenced, of course, by the current superstitions and religious notions of the tribe. But he does not hesitate to make innovations now and then. When religion became more spiritualized the prophet arose.

He was usually a man of the solitudes, and out of his personal communings with Deity he brought his religious message to the people. The claim that the prophet was always a conservative and the champion of established opinions is not borne out by the facts of history. He is perhaps the greatest individual factor in the progress of religious thought.

I have already asserted that an increasing clearness and definiteness in the social consciousness has always brought a corresponding increase in clearness and definiteness in the individual consciousness. The tendency is for individual experience to become more powerful in the life and for individual religious opinion to become more pronounced. Often the individual runs ahead of society and gets hold of more advanced religious ideals. This gives rise to reaction against the established beliefs, customs, and manner of life. This reaction takes either of two directions. It may express itself in an effort to reform the social whole, as in the cases of Savonarola and Luther, or it may run into asceticism or retirement from the life of the

race. Monasticism is the extreme of religious individualism. It represents revolt against the prevailing conditions in the life of society and puts all religious emphasis upon personal responsibility. It is unwholesome because of its unnatural demands on life, and, if universalized, would result in the destruction of the race, though at times it has seemed to present the only refuge from general religious corruption. All extreme tendencies are undesirable and must be avoided.

Perhaps we can find no better summary for closing this chapter than the statement of Dr. Marett's thesis at the beginning of his essay on "A Sociological View of Comparative Religion." His statement of his argument is so interesting that I quote it as a whole, calling attention to the special bearing of the latter part upon the chapter which we are finishing. It runs as follows:

"British anthropologists, exception made of Spencer, have always applied a psychological method to the comparative study of religion, that is, have treated psychological elements as fundamental in religious history.

Other schools have been more inclined to reduce the psychological to the presumed non-psychological, or objective, conditions. Thus, of such objectivist theories, one regards man as primarily determined by his instincts, another as by his race, another as by his economic necessities, another as by geographical conditions; all these views being liable to the charge of apriorism and downright materialism. The sociological school of Durkheim, on the other hand, combines a genuine psychological interest with the gratuitous postulate of determinism, a position which leads them, in their quest for objectivity, to abstract away, and hence in effect to ignore and undervalue, that free moment in human history of which individuality is the expression; whereas, as concretely presented, and hence for the purposes of science as distinct from metaphysics, human experience exhibits the contradictory appearances of determination and freedom in conjunction. Hitherto, however, British anthropologists have been contented to adopt the method of Individual Psychology, and hence are themselves guilty of an abstract treatment of reli-

gion, seeing that religion is in a leading aspect a social product, a phenomenon of intercourse. To remedy this shortcoming, then, the method of a social psychology is needed, and, for the study of rudimentary religion, should even be made paramount. The religious society, rather than the religious individual, must be treated as primarily responsible for the feelings, thoughts, and actions that make up historical religion; though, strictly, to speak of a religious society as owning the soul thus manifested is no more than a methodological fiction—just as the abstract soul of Individual Psychology is, in another way, a fiction too. Exclusive reliance on a Social Psychology being thus ruled out by the abstractness of its point of view, room must be found for the cooperation of the subsidiary disciplines. The first is Individual Psychology, which, as applied to history, will attach no small measure of explanatory value to the higher manifestations of individuality, individual initiation being, however, less in evidence under the sway of primitive custom. The second is Social Morphology, a line of inquiry most

fruitfully prosecuted by the French sociologists aforesaid, which, however, as such stops short at the external condition, the social envelope; the informing spirit of religion being the concern of Social, assisted by individual, Psychology." [1]

[1] Reprinted from The Threshold of Religion, pp. 122, 123, by R. R. Marett, by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY

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For the Christian, of course, the supreme religion is Christianity. He may not always be able to give a clear and definite reason for the faith that is within him, but nevertheless he regards it as the supreme religious faith. Other religions, then, are for him of secondary interest. They are studied largely that they may throw light upon the practical problems of Christianity, or that a way may be found for Christianity to supplant them. The study of comparative religion from the standpoint of the Christian is always for a better understanding of Christianity or a better understanding of the religious side of human nature that Christianity may make wider progress. Hence a special chapter on the relation of social evolution to the development of Christianity.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND THE

If Christianity is the supreme religion and is to become the universal religion, a study of its development is a matter of special importance. It will be in order to determine what we mean by Christianity, to study the social aspects of the background and source of Christianity, and to consider the social factors that have operated in its development up to the present time.

What do we mean by Christianity? Very often a thing may so far depart in character and meaning from its significance at its beginning that the name formerly applied to it loses appropriateness. Hence names do not always guide us into meanings. Voltaire said of the Holy Roman Empire that it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. A great deal passes for Christianity that is not Christianity. If an institution, or system of teaching, or civilization cannot find its origin and basis in the spirit and teaching of Jesus Christ, it is not Christian, no matter what its historical connections with Christianity may have been. That is the real test of the meaning of Christianity. Christianity may be thought of as having two aspects. We may

think of Christianity as that set of teachings promulgated by Jesus Christ and his disciples, especially those of Christ himself, and embodied in the New Testament Scriptures. Or we may think of Christianity as the social organism growing out of the movement started by Christ in the world, an organism seeking to follow in its development the principles that he taught, and striving, with a greater or less measure of success, to attain unto the standards of life which he set up. In this chapter we shall consider Christianity as a social organism. In the next chapter we shall consider it as the set of teachings promulgated by the Master.

Christianity has its background in Judaism. "As the Vedas offer a glimpse into the antecedents of Greek mythology, so Hebrew studies open up vistas into the antecedents of Christian dogma." [1] Hebraic history, Hebraic prophecy, the development of the Hebrew religion, all find their fulfillment in Christianity. Professor Ames treats Christianity as the sixth epoch in the development

[1] George Santayana, Reason in Religion, p. 69, Charles Scribner's Sons, Publishers.

of the Hebrew religion. A great deal of Hebrew morality is carried over bodily into Christianity, and some of the forms of religious ceremony have survived in the new religion. Christianity is, properly speaking, a supersedure of Judaism. Certain things are carried over, certain things have been thrown away, certain things improved, and certain things entirely new have been added. Hence a study of the development of Christianity must begin with a study of the development of the religion of the Jews.

The Hebrew religion had its beginnings in Babylonia. There is a kinship between the Babylonish and Hebraic cosmologies that amounts almost to an identity. Besides, we have the historical record that the Hebrew race was born in the religion of Babylonia. Abraham came out of Ur of the Chaldees. Professor Henry Preserved Smith, in his Old Testament History, says that Abraham as an individual did not exist, but Abraham was the name used in the personification of a clan. This, however, seems to be a mere assumption, an opinion that carries even less evidence to support it than the

opinion that Abraham was an individual ancestor of a great race. It was doubtless based on an analogy with the case of Homer and the Heroic Age of the Greeks rather than on Arab usage, as it claims to have been. But it has not been shown clearly to all minds that Homer was not an individual whom the Greeks exalted as the representative of the Heroic Age, a great outstanding personality with whom the age was fused. There is nothing to say scientifically against the existence of an individual patriarchal ancestor. There is much to say against the modern fanciful method of breaking up individual characters of history as if they were all fictitious composites of ancient racial life until more evidence comes in to justify such a course. But whether we regard Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as individual patriarchs or as clan names, the bearing upon this discussion is quite the same. The Hebrew came out of Babylonia and his early religious ideas bear a likeness to the religious ideas of the very ancient Babylonians. We may say that the Hebrew religion had its beginnings in Babylonia, though its most important modi-

fications came in the desert and later. The Babylonish origin is not a matter of extreme importance. Its chief significance is the key that it offers to the racial tendencies that may have operated in the development of the religion of the Hebrews. Through migration the Hebrew people swung so free from Babylonish influences as to develop a religion entirely independent in character. Babylonish influence does not again have a serious part in the development of the religion of the Hebrews until the time of the captivity.

The religion of the patriarchal period partakes of the nomadic character of the life of that period. It is transitory and rather indefinite. Neither the religion nor the period itself is quite so indefinite, though, as some historians treat it. They practically leave the patriarchal period in the shadows of complete obscurity, utterly discounting the biblical narrative that deals with this period. It would seem a very strange fact that nothing substantial should be handed down by tradition from this age. It would certainly be unlike the history of other peoples.

It is admitted that these narratives were written at a late date, but to say that they are wholly imaginative and entirely unreliable is to make an assumption that seems to be unwarranted. Why not assume that some credence may be given to what Jewish writers of a later period gathered up from the traditions of their race? Granted that a great deal of imaginative material went into it, it still gives a convincing account of the early life of a great people.

The religion of the patriarchs, judging from the evidences that remain, had nothing of animism in it. If it can be shown at all that the Hebrew religion ever had an animistic stage, we might call the patriarchal period the stage of preanimistic religion among the Hebrews. It remains, however, for definite evidence to be brought forward that the Hebrews were ever animistic in their religious beliefs. There is no warrant for assuming that the polydæmonism of the desert, the prevailing religion of the desert, was the type of desert religion held by the Hebrews at any period of their sojourn there. They carried into the desert the ideas of the patri-

archs. The idea of God as held by the patriarchs was a rather vague, and perhaps crude, idea of a Supreme Being. Exodus 6. 2 gives an interesting glimpse of that fact, and it has the marks of a historical statement. The God of the Hebrews before the time of Moses was not called Yahweh, but El Shaddai, "God Almighty."

Under the influence of the Kenites a new conception of God came to the Hebrews, more concrete, more serviceable, but narrower. God became purely the God of Israel. He became a national divinity. The tendency of Kenite influence was to localize the Deity. The Hebrew religion passed from a tribal religion to a national religion at this point of its development, centralizing the various floating ideas and traditions into more definite ideas of the attributes of the God of Israel and of Israel's relation to him. Judaism remains to this day a national religion. It has never passed beyond that.

There is unmistakable evidence that something very much like totemism was practiced by the Hebrews. A totem animal is one that becomes identified with the tribal life and has

a place in religious worship. The Hebrews were originally shepherds and later cattle raisers. The lamb and the bull were both used as sacrificial animals in the ceremonies of religious worship and came to be regarded as sacred animals. This was perhaps a form of totemism. The use of these animals came to have an almost purely symbolic significance, but the totemistic atmosphere remained with them always. But the assumption by Professor Ames that these animals were identified with the Deity in any general way, or that Yahweh was regarded as having the form of the sheep or bull, is without foundation in the records of the life of the Hebrew people. It is based upon a reasoning from an analogy which removes all uniqueness from the Hebrew religion and takes away its distinctive character and superiority. It is a fallacy that all religions have had the same process of development. The ruling out of any other assumption by the psychologist and anthropologist means the application of the baldest *a priori* methods to the study of religion.

After the Jews had become fairly settled

in the land of Canaan the religious ideas of the people there began to find their way into the religious thought of the nation. There arose a great conflict between the worshipers of Baal and the worshipers of Yahweh. Baal worship had gained such a foothold that an attempt was made to have it supersede the worship of Yahweh as the religion of the Hebrew people. The principle involved was the difference in the moral ideals of the respective religions. Baal worship was an immoral religion and belonged to those peoples among whom oppression and Oriental despotism prevailed. Yahweh worship carried with it a stern morality and a growing morality. It could not separate itself from the ethical. Righteousness had been worked into its inner essence. The prophets were the champions of Yahweh. They were conservatives in one sense and radicals in another. They were the champions of the main principles of the established religious dogma. They were cut loose, at the same time, from the binding and crystallizing influences that were upon the priests. They were under inspiration and each had his

own free message. It was the spontaneous expression of the religious message of the prophets, a message born out of a fresh and vital religious experience, that gave the religion of the Hebrews the development that prepared the way for Christianity. Professor Santayana says that the prophets put new wine into old bottles. Coming as they did, with a message tending toward universalization in religion, and conditioning Yahweh's help on national righteousness, it is little wonder that they were stoned before their message was heard. The tendency of the belief of the past had been toward an unconditioned national Deity. The history of the prophets is a history of religious progress, while the history of the kings is largely a history of national sin.

The effect of contact with other nations and a consequent enlargement of the conception of God led up to universalization in religion. But some of the Hebrews, most of them really, could not take this step. Christianity represents that phase or step in a course of religious development by which a break is made with the national religion

and a new world religion is brought into being.

Christianity began with Jesus Christ. He is its personal source. He is the fountain out of which it sprang. Jewish antecedents are not sufficient to account for Christianity. They indicate that some sort of a break was sure to follow; they prepared the way for a spiritual crisis in the world; but it was the personality of Jesus Christ that gave the Christian movement shape and soul. Out of his thought came the new conceptions of Christian thought and out of his life a new spirit entered into religion.

A personality is not to be considered in terms of pure individualism. It is to a large extent a product of social forces, a focalization of social currents, the expression of social tendencies. Jesus had the heritage of racial inclinations operating in his life. He was a Hebrew, and the whole past of the Hebrew race found lodgment in his being. His training and manner of life were Jewish. He was not free from racial connections, but his life was enriched by racial heritage. Jesus was also, to a certain extent, a product

of his times and surroundings. He was brought up at a point where the lines of travel converge and followed a common course. His home was beside the highway of nations. The inflow of world currents upon his life tended toward universalization in the development of his religious thought. This fact helped to make Jesus a world Teacher and Christianity a world religion.

But we must not make too much of the natural and social influences in the life of Jesus. Too much has been made of Jewish influences upon the life of Jesus. If it is true to say that Jesus was what he was because of Jewish influences in his life, it is also true to say that he was what he was in spite of them. Too much is made of Greek and Roman influences upon the growth of Christianity. Not enough has been made of those influences that had their genesis in the personal life of Jesus Christ, that sprang fresh and new from the depth of his being. Out of his personal life came the determinative dynamic elements and factors of the Christian religion and its development. Christianity had its origin in both social and per-

sonal beginnings, and social and personal factors have operated in its development. The coming of Jesus into the world marked a new epoch. It aligned forces of long standing and gave them redirection. It set new forces in motion. It planted the seeds of new influences that would spring up and find their way to the ends of the earth.

There was an attempt by the Jews within the church to thoroughly Judaize Christianity. If that could have been done, it would have amounted to the universalization of a slightly modified Judaism. But Christianity was too radical in character and had received from Christ too much that was spontaneous and vital to submit to any such process. Besides, new factors entered into the development of the Christian religion, factors that tended to swing it clear away from Judaism. The Judaizing factor lost out completely.

One of the new factors that entered into the development of Christianity was Greek philosophy. George Santayana, ex-Catholic, atheist, and spiritual dilettante, says that there never has been a more auspicious time for the beginning of the Christian move-

ment than when Jesus came upon the stage of the world theater. The currents of the world's life seemed to be flowing in uncertain directions in search of a point of focus. They found that point of focus in Jesus Christ. One of these currents was Greek philosophy. It entered into Christianity and offered it a means of self-interpretation. It found in Christianity a means of renewing its own vitality. Its influence is clearly seen in the writings of Paul and John. John took over bodily and incorporated into his Gospel the Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos. From the time of the early Christian fathers up to the present Greek philosophy has entered so strongly into Christian theology as to swallow up or greatly obscure all New Testament teaching. It may not be too strong a statement to make if we say that the orthodox theology of the church, even of the Protestant Church, is more Aristotelian than biblical. Greek philosophy has performed a great service for Christianity, but it has done more than was needed. Getting back nearer to the original starting point and working out a new theology on a strictly New Testa-

ment basis is the thing that will restore the meaning of the Christian religion and put it in accord with the thought of Christ.

The result of the influence of Roman civilization was the paganizing of Christianity. The conversion of Constantine was an important event in religious history, but it did not mark the triumph of Christianity over Roman civilization. It marked the surrender of the church to the corrupting influence of Roman paganism. The abiding result is the Roman Catholic Church. The elaborate ritual, the peculiar type of priesthood, the materialism in thought and life of the Roman Catholic Church are all survivals of Roman paganism. The Roman Catholic Church is to-day more pagan than Christian; and the influence of paganism is still abiding even in Protestantism. The materialistic tendencies of the modern church have their roots in the soil of mediæval paganistic Christianity.

The coming of the barbarian into the Roman empire injected a new element into the life of the Christian Church. There was a new free spirit that found its way into things

and began to work as the leaven of religious awakening. The barbarian, as usually has been the case with conquerors, took over the religion of the people he had conquered, but he modified it by his own character and spirit. Such will always be the case. If a religion will not fit certain natures, they will make it fit. If it cannot adapt, they will destroy it. Along with this tendency to religious awakening came the Renaissance, the revival of learning and general intellectual activity. So an intellectual and religious awakening came together. The combined result was the Reformation. The slavery to pagan custom was broken. Men began to think for themselves and to assert themselves. There was also working a desire to gain deliverance from economic and political oppression that the Church had fostered and maintained. All forces working together brought an upheaval.

The Reformation was, on its purely religious side, a rediscovery of primitive Christianity and a movement in that direction, also a movement in the direction of freedom of thought.

The fact that a break had to take place with the mother church, rather than that the movement should remain within the church and permeate the whole, set a precedent for other breaks. Since that time, any movement in a definite direction, putting emphasis upon any doctrine or line of religious practice, has started with a rupture with an already established religious body and the beginning of a new organization built around the doctrines and practices to be emphasized. This is the denominational movement that has split Protestant Christianity into so many factions. Certain influences are now in operation tending to ultimately reunite Protestant Christianity. The grounds of division are gradually becoming obsolete and internal conflict is dying out.

Protestant Christianity has just emerged from a theological conflict. The ground of the conflict has been the character of the Scriptures, a very vital question to Protestant Christianity. It is the age-long conflict between conservatives and liberals shifted to a new battleground. The conservatives have generally stood for verbal inspiration, or

something closely akin to it; while the liberal attitude has ranged all the way from regarding the Scriptures as the product of free religious experience, the result of a truly divine influence but not infallible, to a practical nullification of Scriptural authority and even the denial that Jesus Christ was a historical person. The result of the conflict has been mutual modification. The Bible is today less a mechanical force and more a vital force in Christian life.

The church is just now in the midst of the modern social movement. The activities of Protestantism, in order to thoroughly emphasize the personal relation to God, have hitherto been strongly individualistic. The need of larger efforts and the inadequacy of a single method of operation is becoming apparent.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF JESUS

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Jesus Christ and his teachings represent the acme of Christian development. His teachings are both fundamental and ideal. They are the basic principles upon which any real Christianity must be built, and they are the standards of the highest possible Christian attainment. They are ideal in the futuristic sense of the word, and this means that they carry the idea of ultimate attainment. The unattainable has no pulling force as an ideal, holds no appeal, cannot be the object of real interest. Hence it loses the larger part of its meaning as an ideal. Mr. Herbert Spencer was never further wrong than when he taught the appeal of the Unknowable to the religious inclination, claiming that the vastness of mystery in that conception of God was the great incentive to awe and worship. As a matter of fact, men have an

interest in God because of what they feel they know about him or may know about him. Passing from the known to the unknown is the ground of abiding interest, and, hence, of idealization. There must be a known element before the unknown can be reached, and the unknown is attractive only because it may become the known. Neither the unknowable nor the unattainable has any appeal to human interest or effort. It is the partially known and partially attained or the possibility of knowing and attainment that give the ideal its life and meaning. We may expect, therefore, in connection with the teachings bearing the stamp of the universal and of the eternal a partial attainment of ends and a great deal lying in the course of future development.

The social teachings of Jesus, as well as all his other teachings, to conform to the demand upon him to reveal the central and universal truths of human life in relation to divine life, could not enter upon a close and immediate application to the organized life of the race as it existed in his time or might exist in subsequent time. They must be gen-

eral principles the application of which was to be worked out in the development of the Christian religion. We find them in his Sermon on the Mount, his parables, and in the various utterances in connection with incidents of his life and recorded in the gospel narratives.

An important sidelight upon the social teachings of the Master is his disposition toward society and toward life, His personal attitude. Mr. Santayana, in his Reason in Religion, says that the spirit of the gospel, the literary reflection of the spirit of Christ, is ascetic. This is a strange conclusion; and it is hard to see how any man reading the gospel, and remaining unbiased by some special theory, could ever come to such a conclusion. It is true that the Master had his long seasons of prayer and fasting, but it is also true that he spent much time in the society of various classes and individuals. He attended weddings and feasts; he was found in pleasant social intercourse with friends; He was very much among the multitudes. Indeed, his participation in dinners and feasts of various kinds was responsible for the ac-

cusation that he was a man gluttonous and a wine-bibber, and in this respect his manner of life was contrasted with the ascetic life of John the Baptist the Nazarite. One of the grounds of attack by the Pharisees was that he ate with publicans and sinners. It seems that it was not the current opinion of his contemporaries that he was a pale ascetic. Really the picture we get of Jesus in the Gospels is that of a man among men, very much interested in human life on the earth, and very sympathetic with its joys and sorrows. His attitude is not entirely otherworldly nor predominantly so.

The teachings of Jesus deal with the ethical aspect of the social life. His concern for human society is a moral concern. His realm is the spiritual. He, therefore, looks upon society from the moral rather than from the economic standpoint, and only in so far as economic interests coincide with spiritual interests is Christianity concerned with them. Jesus came to give us a better world, to redeem humanity from sin and misery. He came that men might have life and have it more abundantly. When questions of

wealth and poverty involve human happiness and progress—and they usually do—they become matters of moral concern. But Jesus approaches them on the side of the ethical. This constitutes the chief difference between Christianity and Socialism. Socialism contends that economic interests are basic in human life and Christianity contends that spiritual interests are basic. Righteousness is the fundamental concern of the message of Christ. Making universal humanity ultimately righteous in the fullest sense is the mission of Christ in the world.

Before going into any detailed study of the social teachings of Jesus it is well to come to a recognition of the fundamental moral principle that underlies all of this teaching, and we should never allow it to drop out of sight in the consideration of any special phase of his social teaching. That fundamental principle is the need of the moral regeneration of the race before the ideals of the gospel can be realized. As Dr. Shailer Mathews has said, "There is no social gospel for bad people." Therefore the social aims and the moral aims of Christianity are bound

up together. The coming of the kingdom of God in all its fullness means the regeneration of every human heart.

Jesus founds his doctrines of society upon the individual life. He starts with the individual life. He does not start with the social whole, regarding the individual life as a sort of division mark or point of distinction in that social whole, but he regards society as an aggregation of individuals having relationship one to another because of the nature of human life. Each life has capacity for fellowship with other lives and affinity for relationship with its fellows, and upon that capacity and that affinity the structure of society is built. The whole social teaching of Jesus rests upon the sacredness and worth of the individual life. It has been truly said that, for religion, Jesus discovered the individual. As was noted in the preceding chapter, the Hebrew religion was a national religion and the Hebrew religious consciousness was a social consciousness. The worth of the individual life was lost sight of in the thought of the welfare of the nation. Paganism thought of man as existing for the

state and of the common herd as existing for the better classes. Primitive religion has always laid the greater emphasis upon group interests. Jesus seems to have been the first great religious teacher to lay a clear emphasis upon the primacy of the individual. He taught the primacy of the inner life. It is that which cometh out of that inner life that constitutes defilement. All moral regeneration, then, must proceed from within. The doctrine of the kingdom of God is founded upon the doctrine of a new spiritual birth for each life. The high regard of the Master for the individual is shown by the fact that some of his profoundest and most important utterances were delivered to single persons. The doctrine of the new birth was first given to Nicodemus in a private interview. To the woman at the well, a social outcast, he taught the spirituality of God and of worship. No man could fall so low in the eyes of his fellows that Jesus would despise him. This disapproval of society seemed to make no difference to the Master. He threw aside all social conceit to maintain his ideal of the sacredness and worth of the individual.

Jesus and Nietzsche, the madman, both emphasized the supreme worth of the individual. Both protested against the lumping of life in aggregations and putting it under the dull grind of the customary and commonplace. Both had the superman idea. Nietzsche's superman is the ruthless, dominant individual, putting his foot upon the neck of the mob of his weaker and more commonplace fellows. Selfishness is the dominant idea of his individualism. His superman triumphs by unscrupulously taking advantage of his fellows. The interests of others and of humanity as a whole are to be disregarded utterly. Christ's superman is the servant of humanity. He reaches the heights of greatness through devotion to his fellows. His superiority is the superiority of benefaction. His triumph is the triumph of love and service which puts the race under everlasting obligation to him. His highest individual welfare is consonant and identical with the welfare of his race. He rises to the triumph of his personal power, not by trampling down his fellows, but by lifting them up. He thus becomes dominant over a better hu-

manity rather than master of a humanity that is crushed and weakened by oppression. Thus the social life is the means of the highest development of the individual life. This thought pervades the whole teaching of Jesus concerning mankind.

All the relations of the individual to his fellows are social relations. All the teachings of Jesus bearing upon the relation to "brothers" and "neighbors" are social teachings, anything that has to do with the relation of the personal life to any part of the life of humanity.

The fundamental institution of society is the family. It has been clearly demonstrated that family life is essential to the advance of civilization. Jesus did not go into any detailed teaching concerning family life, important as it is. He really touched it only at one point, the preservation of its integrity. The reason for this is evident. Given the essentials of family life, kept sacred and inviolate, and all that is needed to perfect it are the principles of righteousness that apply to life in general. The only specific teaching that the Master needed to give was the teach-

ing that he did give. "The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and cleave unto his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery" (Matt. 19. 3-9). In this teaching is the ideal involving the recognition of the essential worth of womanhood and the definition of marriage as the union of two

moral equals. This is the only ideal of marriage that has ever stood the test. A low ideal of womanhood means the production of an inferior type of womanhood; and, since the influence of woman over children and over men is immeasurably large, it means finally a blighted manhood. Polygamy leads to discard and to an undesirable type of family life. The constant recognition of the worth and sacredness of each individual life, male and female, lends sacredness to the marital relation. This must be kept sacred and irrevocable if the home is to have stability. This kept clear and clean, and family life will adjust itself by the natural evolution that goes on in the life of the race.

Concerning social sin we do not have very many direct expressions from the Master. He upholds the moral law as expressed in the Ten Commandments. The social sins of the Decalogue—lying, stealing, adultery, murder, and covetousness—are to have no place in the Christian spirit or practice. He goes further than Moses in his treatment of the individual's responsibility for social sin. The motive, the intent of the heart, is suffi-

cient to determine guilt. But Jesus does not attack the great social evils of his day. He says nothing about slavery. He does not mention the evils of the Roman political system. He says, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." He asks, indignantly, "Who made me a judge and a divider among you?" He steadfastly refused to be drawn into any temporary propaganda. His mission was eternal and not for a particular age. His message was for universal humanity and not for any particular people. He could not afford to specialize. He went on the assumption that the foundation of life upon the right sort of ethical principles would ultimately eliminate both personal and social sin. He set himself the task of stating and exemplifying those principles. It is safe to say that if all lives were lived in accordance with his teachings and example, all social sin would drop out of existence. But is such a thing possible? It is possible, but not on the plane of the unregenerate, where human selfishness is dominant.

It has been asserted in this chapter that

Jesus made the spiritual life basic rather than the economic. But what is his doctrine concerning wealth? A superficial interpretation of a portion of his utterances would make him a drastic opponent of the accumulation of riches. He says that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. He announces at the beginning of his ministry his mission to preach the gospel to the poor, and the credential of his Messiahship that He gives to John is that the poor have the gospel preached unto them. In the parable of Dives and Lazarus the poor man is in heaven and the rich man is in hell. He demands that the rich young ruler give up his great possessions. He makes favorable comment upon the giving of the poor widow at the temple, and seems to disparage the giving of the rich men. He seems to condemn wealth and exalt poverty. But is Jesus really an enemy to rich men and does he condemn wealth as such? He had among his disciples men who possessed considerable property. He looked favorably upon Zacchæus and brought salva-

tion to his house, although Zacchæus was both a rich and a mean man. He ate with rich men. He allowed the lavish use of costly ointment on his person and rebuked the objector who would have sold it and given the money to the poor. Jesus certainly did not regard poverty as an ideal condition nor teach men so. He was seeking all the while to relieve the suffering resulting from it. He simply gave warning concerning the deceitfulness of riches. He knew the power of wealth to make men selfish and arrogant, to materialize them, to blind their eyes to spiritual truth, to bind them hand and foot with the shackles of selfish sin. He knew the seductiveness of wealth, its tendency to mix moral values and to pervert conscience, its incentive to oppression and injustice. He must utter warnings. He must state the difficulty of leading a spiritual life under conditions of prosperity.

Of course Jesus would apply the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," to the process of the accumulation of wealth. Any getting possession of property without rightful return is stealing. Gambling is a form

of stealing. Certain forms of business speculation amount to stealing. The commandment against covetousness is upheld in Christ's teaching. And the Golden Rule is applicable here. "Love thy neighbor as thyself" is also applicable. These principles rather hedge men about and hamper them in the exercise of their "personal liberties." But be that as it may, they are the demands of Jesus for the Christian's wealth getting.

There is an important connection between the word "use" and the word "sin." The wrong use of our powers or possessions constitutes sin. After wealth is acquired, the next moral question that arises is the question of its use. Men must not be mastered by their wealth. They must master it and use it rightly. Jesus declares, "Ye cannot serve both God and mammon." But a man may use his money for the service of God and humanity. Jesus expects his kingdom to go forward by means of financial support. He says, "The laborer is worthy of his hire." While the parable of the talents does not apply peculiarly to the use of money, it indicates the attitude of

Jesus toward the use of possessions. They are matters of trust. The rich man is under an obligation according to his special opportunity. He is a debtor to God and to humanity. And he cannot serve God except through humanity. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." In everything wealth is to be made subservient to the spiritual interests and to the good of the race. The idea that "business is business" and that the principles of humanity can be set aside for any time in its interest finds no justification in the teachings of the Christ nor in common sense. Jesus would exempt no part of life from the application of his principles of right.

In the chapter on factors in socialization we briefly considered war as one of those factors. It is in order now to consider the bearing of Christ's teachings upon the questions of war and peace. It should be stated at the outset that Jesus had no direct teaching upon the subject of war. His references to war were of a purely incidental nature. If we desire to arrive at an understanding of the bearing of his teachings upon the subject

of war, we must seek to determine what would be the result for war if the ethical principles that he taught governing conduct were given a wide and general application to the affairs of nations. If Jesus approached society through the individual, then those principles that may be applied to the conduct of individuals may also be applied to the conduct of nations.

Jesus has a doctrine concerning the use of force, and that doctrine has a bearing upon the subject of war. A proper interpretation of his doctrine of force, often called the doctrine of nonresistance, will afford insight upon the attitude of Jesus toward war. His doctrine of nonresistance is found in the turn-the-other-cheek command in the Sermon on the Mount. This is a doctrine of patience. It was uttered against the principle of retaliation, a principle that is always wrong for men and nations. Too much care for so-called personal honor and national honor soon runs into personal and national egotism, arrogance, and insolence. Nations and men need to have forbearance and toleration. But to say that this teaching of Jesus

is, in any absolute sense, the denial of the right to the use of force is to stretch it beyond the bounds of its intended meaning. Jesus was not an anarchist. He would not have advocated and did not advocate the overthrow of government. Government means at least the potentiality of the use of force for police measures. It would be wrong for society to allow individuals or nations to ruthlessly invade the rights of others, to destroy them or their property. There is nothing in precept or intimation or in the spirit of Christ's teaching to give even the hint of a basis for such a doctrine of nonresistance as that would imply. If the protection of the innocent means the use of force, there is nothing in the teachings of the Master that is opposed to such a use of force. While it may be said that there is nothing in the teaching of Christ to back up self-defense, there is nothing that is opposed to the defense of others. A nation may justify itself in going to war against another nation on the ground that it is defending its citizens against attack. There is something more than self-defense involved in that.

The command of Jesus to beware of covetousness would apply to nations. So would his teachings concerning selfishness. He would never sanction a war for conquest. Neither could the enforcement of our ideals, no matter how worthy or helpful we might consider them, upon others who did not care to possess them find support in his teaching. His command to his disciples to shake the dust off their feet in the places where they were not received is sufficient upon that point. A great deal is made of the incident of the cleansing of the temple, but there is no overwhelming evidence that Jesus employed physical force in this instance or in any other. He may have picked up some cords to start the cattle moving. He did not have to use force on the cowering skulking money-changers. They went without it. They were condemned in their own eyes.

Now, let us take up that passage that has been so often quoted to show that Jesus upheld war: "Think not that I am come to send peace on the earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter

against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law." This is a strange passage to come from the lips of Christ. He who said, "Blessed are the peacemakers," is become the strifemaker, the author of discord, the instigator of conflict! The sword is the symbol of war, and it certainly seems, at the first reading of this announcement, that Jesus is announcing a propaganda of war. What is the explanation? There is certainly no ground for assuming that Jesus was pugnacious in spirit. He knew that the movement he was inaugurating would produce antagonisms, would provoke hostility, would foment discord. Lines of cleavage would be drawn between those who accepted his ideals and those who did not. He knew that he was dealing with matters so deep and vital that men would fight over the issues. He knew that his followers must suffer persecution. Christianity is selective. It is uncompromising. It cannot adopt a policy of opportunism because it is an idealistic movement. But because Jesus introduced a program that would find opposition and generate conflict is no evi-

dence that he was in favor of war. He rather counseled his disciples patiently to endure persecution. When Peter drew his sword in the garden for the defense of his Lord, Jesus said, "Peter, put up thy sword; for they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." He taught his disciples not to fear them that could kill the body. His constant assumption was that spiritual ideals lived up to and suffered for, even unto death, would ultimately win.

To state the general attitude of Jesus, reasoning from his recorded teachings, we could say that he was opposed to war as a positive principle. It might be justifiable under certain contingencies, but never desirable. Every effort should be made to avoid it; and, if his principles were universally applied, war would be eliminated. The fact that he would enunciate principles that would finally eliminate war shows that he regarded it as an evil, and not as an instinctive necessity of life, necessary to the development of character. The fighting instinct of the Christian is to find its best expression in reason's opposition to evil, in the overcoming of self, and in re-

sistance to temptation. The teaching of militarists, that war is necessary to the development of heroic character, lacks support both in Christ's teaching and in philosophy. The fact that certain good comes through war, and that certain great characters seem to have been developed in its exercises, does not prove that these results might not have been attained by other means. There is a cosmic principle at work in the world that makes the best of everything, even the most gigantic evils. There has never been the operation of a perfect plan in the world. If such a perfect plan is ever in operation, it must be in the future. Christianity aims at moving humanity toward the operation of this perfect plan.

It is evident that the fulfillment of the ethical ideals of Christ's teaching would require a new social order. Professor Montague, of Columbia University, said recently that no man could carry out the commands of Christ in the system of cut-throat competition that now obtains in the business life of this country without rendering himself liable to destruction from competitors. That is a

rather emphatic contention, but it certainly holds a preponderance of truth. Such principles as the Golden Rule cannot be made operative in the world of affairs on a purely individual basis. The teaching of Jesus would be vague, indefinite, and scrappy if it did not contain the conception of such a social order as would conform to its ethical ideals. That conception is found in the Master's teaching concerning the "kingdom of God," or "kingdom of heaven." Any reading of the New Testament that goes any depth below superficiality will discover that Christ's usual references to the "world" are not to the natural world or to the world of men as such. They refer to the established order of life as he finds it. Christianity contemplates a new order which is to supplant the "world." That new order is the "kingdom of God."

The "kingdom of God" was not a new invention of Jesus. It was part of the spiritual heritage of his day and race. He saw no need for defining it at the outset. The people to whom he spoke were familiar with the term. But Jesus did give it a new signifi-

cance. He started with the conception as it came to him. It grew and enlarged in his own consciousness and was gradually unfolded to his disciples. The Jews expected in the establishment of the kingdom of God either political deliverance or a spiritual leadership that would make Judaism as a religion dominant and ultimately universal. The more spiritual Hebrews expected the latter. A great many Jewish Christians never got away from this conception of the kingdom of God. They thought the world was to be saved by Judaizing the whole human race. Jesus broke away from the most sacred Jewish traditions and ideals and spiritualized, intensified, and enlarged the conception of the kingdom of God.

We have noticed that Jesus approached society through the individual, regarding society as constituted of individual lives, and social rights and duties as arising from the sacredness of personal life. We may therefore expect Christ, in his doctrine of the Kingdom, to start with its individual aspect. This he does. He said to Nicodemus, "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be

born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." He said to the Pharisees, "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; . . . behold, the kingdom of God is within you." It is a spiritual fact springing up within the life. It becomes social by contagion. Its growth and development in intensity and scope mean the evolution of a new social order, conformable to the ethics of Jesus.

We cannot now get a conception of all that this new social order will finally mean. Potentialities must be worked out to be fully calculable. But the Master gave us some definite teaching that leaves us in no doubt as to the main facts.

First of all, the kingdom of God is a kingdom of earth. Jesus made it so much a matter of earth that he talked of coming back to earth for its final consummation. He prayed in his model prayer, "Thy name be hallowed, thy kingdom come, thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven." He prayed that his disciples be not taken from the world but kept from evil. We cannot escape the conviction, if we read the whole teaching of

Jesus on the kingdom of God with an unprejudiced mind, that it is primarily a doctrine of life on the earth. Jesus was eminently practical, and this gives a practical emphasis to religion. Man must live on the earth first. The immediate concern, then, is the right relation of man to man in this present world. Man is all the while under the shadow of eternity, but that does not minimize the importance of his earthly life. It rather increases its significance and its demands.

The ethical ideas lying at the foundation of this new social order are the universal brotherhood of mankind, the primacy of humanity, and democracy. Brotherhood means cooperation. An industrial system of selfish competition is utterly contrary to Christ's teaching. The highest ideal that he holds up before his disciples is that of altruistic service. His supreme ethical aim is to obliterate selfishness from human life. His doctrine of unselfishness is inconsistent with the principle of competition. Before our modern civilization can claim to be Christian in any real sense, it must be reorganized on the cooperative basis. As suggested in

another connection, the cooperative system of the kingdom of God differs from the cooperative system of socialism in that it grounds itself in the primacy of the personal life rather than in the idea that property lies at the foundation of life. It is a difference of emphasis and spirit. The practical principle of cooperation would be the same, once it were attained. There is a question as to the possibility of its attainment by economic endeavor. That is really the big obstacle of socialism. But there is no reason why socialism and Christianity might not be blended. The primacy of property is not an essential idea of socialism. It is simply an emphasis upon the necessity of support for the physical organism. If the physical organism is thought of as existing for the higher spiritual nature, we have reached the standpoint of Christianity. A great deal is said about the inconsistency of a doctrine of the kingdom with the idea of democracy. But there is no inconsistency between the ideas of the government of God and human freedom. The monarchical idea, in its usual form, was certainly never prominent either

in the Jewish conception of the kingdom of God or in Christ's teachings. Jesus, on the other hand, emphasized the idea of democracy. He said to his disciples, "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister, and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister" (Matt. 20. 25-28).

As to the development of the kingdom of God, Christ seeks to keep in the foreground one idea—the idea of gradual development. It is not to come by swift revolutionary steps or by cataclysmic upheavals. The parables of the leaven, the mustard seed, and the seed growing gradually are illustrations of Christ's thought of the development of the kingdom. As the process continues, the development is more thorough and more rapid. The main idea is general growth. The ultimate goal is universality and perfection.

This discussion has touched only the high

points of Christ's social teaching. Its aim has been to arrive at what would be the character of the social evolution in connection with the development of a religion based upon and fulfilling the teachings of Jesus Christ. No attempt has been made to combat the arguments against the interpretation here set forth. This whole field of opinion is so wide that any attempt to cover it would be futile. There is endless variety in Scripture interpretation, and every man finds himself standing very largely on his own ground in that matter. It is sufficient to say that this represents the liberal conservative view of the social teachings of Christ.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCIAL SIDE OF RELIGION

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It is interesting to the man of scholarly temperament to study things for the sake of the mere knowledge that may be acquired. And there are studies of a purely disciplinary character and undertaken for that purpose alone. They afford mental gymnastics but they have no practical utility. Such studies are not, comparatively speaking, of the very highest value. And psychology and sociology do not belong in that class. Their concerns are too vital, too thoroughly interwoven with the whole fabric of life. Therefore any such course of study as we have been pursuing would be manifestly incomplete without a consideration of its practical phase. By this I mean its usefulness. Does the study of the psychology of religion or the study of sociology as related to religion help

us in meeting the problems of life, in working for a better race, in bringing about desirable results in the world of men and things? Doubtless the utilitarian motive has been behind most psychological and sociological studies in the field of religion and in other fields. The psychologist, by a study of the development of the religious consciousness and the laws that are in force in its operation, can certainly throw light upon those forms of religious activity that will be most effective and most helpful. The sociologist by a study of the development of human society, of humanity organized in relation to environment and to the individual life, of the relation of religious and social development, can help to widen the scope and increase the efficiency of religious activities.

About the first thing that is discovered is the primacy of human life. The world process seems to be the evolution of life. The social life is one aspect of life. Religion is both an outgrowth of and, in turn, a factor in the development of human life. The lesson that we should learn from this discovery is never to seek to divorce it from

life, to make it unnatural and artificial, a sort of superstructure, appendix, or addendum. Life has its laws and human nature has its fundamental tendencies. If religion is a matter of life, then it ought to be kept in line with the fundamental tendencies of human nature. This is logical, but it is not merely logical; any other course leads to failure, sooner or later, of such religious aims and activities. Several times in history there has been the attempt to make religion opposed to natural life. It has always had its logical result. If religion is a normal and desirable fact of life, nature cannot and will not be unfriendly to it. If a religion is unfriendly to nature, it is a harmful religion, and the sooner it is destroyed the better. Only those religions that are harmonious with natural development can live or ought to live. This is not to be understood as anything like Rousseau's position. It is not an argument for the return to the primitive. We do not want to return to anything. We want to go forward. This view simply regards the spiritual as an outgrowth and a consummation of natural de-

velopment and as not being out of harmony with nature. Regeneration, for example, is the readjustment and right alignment of misdirected natural impulses, so that the life is restored to the normal, plus the increment of divine inspiration—to give vitality to the reorganized life. The notion that religion must revise human nature in its fundamentals and make it something else is radically wrong. Religion that proceeds along this line very far runs into insanity. Hence the importance of aligning religious aims and activities with the fundamental tendencies of human life.

If religion is to be put in line with life, account must be taken of the social side of man's life. In our first chapter we saw how surely and unquestionably man's nature is social. If he is social and if his religious life has been developed largely by social means, his religious life should remain social and its development, to be normal and natural, must continue along the lines of socialization. All the practical significance would fall out of this if conscious purpose did not enter into life in its higher stages.

We can direct the forces of life; and efficiency and success, even the evolutionary process itself, come largely under the control of wisdom and expediency. It is for society to help determine the course of its future development. It is also for religious leaders to determine the course of religious development according to known ideals and according to methods of efficiency and expediency.

Efficiency and expediency demand the use of all the resources at hand and of all legitimate advantages. The laws of crowd psychology throw light upon the management of the crowd. Revival work, especially, may profit by this. Revival methods may become more direct and efficient and results surer. The importance of getting together literally in multitudes will also appear. The control of the crowd is a great advantage that politicians long ago discovered. Masses and mass movements are essential to large results. The consolidation of religious effort is already one of the fruits of the application of sociological learning to religious work. Wasteful rivalries are being eliminated and the cumulative power of combined

effort is being recognized—the truth, long ago expressed, that "One can chase a thousand, and two can put ten thousand to flight."

The basis of all reform and all social progress is the formation of public opinion and public sentiment. This can be done only through education. The temperance movement, for example, could never have made the headway that it has by merely a direct appeal to the public. The temperance advocates brought science to their aid and wrote the truth about alcohol into the school textbooks on physiology. This got hold of the mind of the rising generation, and the thought of the rising generation eventually represented public sentiment, based on an intelligent public opinion. The truth may find expression and a means of influence in circulating periodicals, in books, in platform lectures, in pulpit utterances, in tracts. All this is education, and it is beyond question that a moral reform or a forward step in social progress and religious advancement must have its foundations in the education of public opinion. Æsthetics should be brought into service, and this can be done

effectively only through an understanding of human emotions. Architecture, decoration, location, conditions of comfort, music—all these have an important part in the effectiveness or noneffectiveness of a religious service. Ritualism, dangerous as its overuse may be to the power and spontaneity of the spiritual life, is an essential factor in religious success. It is a means for the social expression of religion. The people can join their voices and merge their minds and hearts in the ritual service. It gives a stronger social consciousness to the service, a sense of fellowship and unity of thought and activity in the assembly. One of the sources of power of the Roman Catholic Church is its ritualism. The churches are filled because the people have a large part in the service. Any minister must be careful lest the service fall entirely into the hands of a few persons and the larger number in the congregation be deprived of any active part in the services. Too much ritualism may have the tendency to sap the personal vitality of religion, but it has often, by being a concrete expression of religion, preserved its definite forms from fading out altogether.

It can be properly used and properly related to spontaneous personal worship. Finally, those activities that are defined as social in the more limited sense must find a more intimate connection with the things of religion. Religion must not set itself against play and amusement. There is no warrant for that, and certainly there is nothing gained by it. The more of the activities of life that can be brought into some connection with religion and religious institutions, the better it is for religion and the better it is for society. The recreational life must not be turned over to those influences that are not only secular but sometimes positively demoralizing. The church is failing to take care of its full responsibility when it fails to take care of and have general oversight over all the connections of the life of the individual, provided those connections are not taken care of by some other wholesome and helpful institution. At any rate, there is a large field here for the church and a still larger field for Christianity in other institutional forms. All life and all institutions that are to abide should be in the program of Christianization.

We need a new social gospel. That will mean the preaching of the full gospel of Jesus Christ with all its implications. We need to conform our social order to our Christian ideals. The striking statement of Professor Montague, referred to in the chapter immediately preceding, voices this need. It is impossible to live up to those ideals unless we do. When we get things far enough away from us to see them in full perspective, we can come nearer grasping their entire significance. Let us take, for example, conditions in India and see what it means to be a Christian there. "The mere fact of becoming a convert will usually cause a man to become an outcast by his fellows and neighbors. Unless a convert is in a neighborhood, such as most parts of Tinnevelle, where Christianity has already obtained a strong footing, he may well find his livelihood gone. The blacksmith or carpenter finds no one to employ him, the shepherd loses his employers who trusted him with the care of their sheep and cattle, and is lucky if he does not one day wake up to find his own few sheep and cattle stolen or killed. Perhaps a false charge of

theft may be brought against him, as happened to a poor shepherd convert whom I had the privilege of baptizing."[1] This indicates how impossible it is for a man to be separated from his social environment, and how impossible it is for a religion to gain headway without modifying the social environment. In our so-called Christian countries the man who would undertake to live out literally the teachings of Jesus Christ would find himself in almost as bad condition as the East Indian convert. Tolstoy tried it, and the world regarded him as insane. Even many representatives of religion joined in the general opinion. But the generations to come will laud Tolstoy for having the courage of his convictions. Even now, as public opinion is being modified, there is the tendency to praise him. Certainly, we ought to have a civilization based upon principles that are not inconsistent with the teachings of Jesus Christ if we are to call it Christian.

Something has been said about Christian-

[1] Quoted from C. W. Weston by W. H. P. Faunce in Social Aspects of Foreign Missions, p. 146.

ity going to pieces in the great conflict that has been raging in Europe. But there has never been a Christian civilization in Europe nor anywhere else. We have not touched the rim of Christian civilization. Christian civilization lies somewhere in the future, perhaps in the dim and distant future. It is an ideal to be reached. We have been very slowly climbing upward in its direction, climbing upward and tumbling backward; but, on the whole, some progress has been made toward a Christian civilization. But we can never reach it so long as our aims are purely individualistic. Christianity will never catch the world of men by the hook-and-line method alone. The kingdom of heaven is like unto a net cast into the sea to bring in good and bad together. The bad are to be eliminated after the net has been drawn in. Christianity has a mission to save the world. But the world is not merely an aggregation of individuals making up the population of the earth. The world is that aggregation plus the relations existing between individuals, the relations existing between individuals and the physical environ-

ment and the relations existing between the social whole and the physical environment. Christianity needs to declare the whole counsel of God and to apply it to communities, to government, to industry, to wealth, to international relationships, to the whole round of social connection. The failure of the church to declare the whole counsel of God and the misplacing of emphasis in the giving of the message are among the causes of the present world catastrophe. The teaching of the church has been too narrow, individualistic, and other-worldly. Its aims and its faith have been too puny and small.

Christians have not dared to apply their gospel to the whole of life. When we begin insistently and steadily to apply it to the whole of life, it will commence to transform, in real fashion, our modern civilization. Carried along as a system of admitted truth, but inconsistent with life practice, it will become more and more enfeebled and ineffectual.

In the mission fields, where conditions are frankly not Christian conditions, as I suggested in another connection, Christianity

recognizes the need of a larger application of the gospel. "To fight one evil alone is to fail. All of them are parts of a wrong social order, filled with disdain for the Christian ideal. The one thing which we seek is simply the incarnation of the Christian ideal and Christian purpose in human society and in all human institutions." Rightly was it said by the Rev. T. E. Slater: "We need to enlarge our idea of the meaning of the evangelization of men and races until it comes to stand for the perfection of the soul in the perfect society. Since the soul, the man himself, cannot be fully saved or made whole and strong, as long as the soul's environment, its conditions of life, are unfavorable, all social work, all educational work, all medical work, all industrial work, is work done for the soul and is a part of its salvation. Above and beyond the preaching and teaching of certain doctrines of religion, and the laboring for the credit of a particular (missionary) society, is the part the missionary plays in the world's evolution toward the higher Christian life. He stands for upward and forward social

and national movements among backward and arrested peoples, as a representative of the divine ideal and the divine kingdom which is to embrace and unite and elevate the entire human race."[1] Christianity is beginning to see the necessity of applying the whole gospel in the mission fields. If it is good for the transformation of purely unchristian civilizations, it ought to be good for the transformation of a partially unchristian civilization.

What form, then, would the gospel take if we should apply it to our economic life? It would apply the Golden Rule and "Love thy neighbor as thyself" to business life. A full application of these ethical principles would work a revolution in modern business life that would stagger the imagination. Just the thorough application of some fundamental, almost rudimentary, principles of Christianity would revolutionize our business life. Can we say, then, that our civilization is Christian? The new economic order that would follow the application of these

[1] W. H. P. Faunce, Social Aspects of Foreign Missions, p. 168.

Christian principles would be based upon the principle of cooperation rather than competition. Individual interest would be minimized and individual greed gradually eliminated. The general good—the highest good of the race—would become the supreme good. The laborer would be regarded as worthy of his hire. Social justice, rather than private gain, would be the first consideration.

But how can any such condition be brought about? It certainly could not be brought about by any means so long as men think and feel as they do now. But it is Christianity's business to change men's thinking and feeling. The process is already started. A new business ethic is being created before our very eyes. Christianity must intensify its program of social education. We must write a new economic viewpoint into our Sunday school literature, we must put it into the text-books of the public schools, we must voice it from the pulpit, we must give it expression in the religious press and, as far as possible, in the secular press. There must be a patient, tireless, unrelenting program of education carried forward.

While Christianity insists upon the primacy of the spiritual life rather than the economic, it must recognize that the transformation of the economic life by a new system of ethics will work the transformation of civilization as a whole. Politics will be adjusted to economic conditions. International relationships will be formed with regard to the new economic order.

The chief difficulty that Christianity will meet in the carrying forward of a social program will be with those whom we have been accustomed to call conservative. The conservative will all the while be crying, "Back to the old paths!" He will be joined in his efforts by the sentimentalist. This task has no place for the sentimentalist or the reactionary. Perhaps the best thing that can be done for the reactionary is to let him die. Professor Borden P. Bowne in the closing words of the preface to his Ethics gives us some pertinent advice for dealing with the sentimentalist. He says, "The lawyer, the economist, the historian and the moralist must work together, and the sentimentalist must be left out."

CHAPTER VII

WORLD CONFLICT AND RECONSTRUCTION

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At the time when the civilized world had begun to think of war as a thing belonging to a barbaric past, when the settlement of all international disputes by a permanent world court of arbitration seemed about to be realized as a generally accepted plan, when the burden of the maintenance of armies and navies seemed about to be lifted forever from the shoulders of all the nations, the world suddenly found itself plunged into the most colossal war of history. To the great majority of the people of the world it came with the shock of surprise. Certain voices here and there had been lifted in warning, but their warning was not heeded. Certain philosophers and military enthusiasts had openly and arrogantly declared the purposes of Germany, but they were quite generally regarded as visionaries and demagogues who

did not express the real sentiment of the German nation. Pan-Germanism was not by most people taken very seriously. The nations who must oppose Germany were not prepared for such a conflict. How blind they were and how near they came several times to losing in the struggle are now matters of a familiar story. Only by an adjustment to the emergency that tested the resources of human life and energy to the utmost and by efforts that rose almost to the plane of the superhuman were they able to meet the situation and to win out in the great struggle.

All this goes to show how humanity may go on unconscious of the great social forces at work in the life of the world and how important a knowledge of the nature, magnitude, and direction of these great currents of social life really is. We can all see now what was taking place, but only a few were able to see it in time to prevent it or to prepare for it, and they were not sufficient in numbers and influence to cause the nations to take heed. We ought not to again blunder into such a world situation as this, but

whether we will or not is as yet a matter of uncertainty. Before we shall be beyond such a danger, humanity must reach the condition where it will bring to bear a larger measure of intelligence upon the living of its social life. A great lesson ought to be learned from this experience. Certainly, the experience was big enough and intense enough and costly enough. A retrospect and analysis ought to aid in securing preventive remedies against the recurrence of such a world calamity.

The War of 1914-18 was a conflict between two great political principles, autocracy and democracy. The world had grown too small for both to abide and have room for realization. The time had come for the settlement of the question as to which should prevail. Such an imperialistic dream as that of Germany belongs essentially with an autocratic government. It would never come into existence in a democracy. The whole atmosphere of a democratic political system would be unfriendly to its growth. It grows out of the ambition of one man in possession of large power to increase that power as

much as possible. The possibility of preparing in any effective way for the realization of such a dream of empire would exist only in an autocratic state. Germany had been running a course in social development that was counter to the tendency of the greater part of the rest of the world. The peculiar temperament of her people, the nature of the preceding events that had conditioned the social, industrial, and political development of the nation, the tendency of her philosophical thought, all enabled political leaders under the sway of an ambitious Kaiser to put all the dynamic agencies operating in the life of the German people under the control of an autocratic purpose. Democratic sentiments were overwhelmed. A great military machine was developed for the carrying out of the imperial purpose and the public sentiment of the nation was saturated by tireless educational effort with the idea of "Deutschland über Alles." The first flimsy pretext that could be made the ground of war was eagerly seized upon for hurling the great German war machine upon the nations that stood opposed to autocracy or

that offered fields of conquest. These nations responded with alacrity. Virtual military miracles followed one another in rapid succession. Unexpected resistance met the German onslaught. Coalitions and amalgamations were brought about that would have been unthinkable except for the great emergency. The world was determined, once it was awakened from the nightmare of its predicament, to use every necessary means for resisting Germany to the last ditch. At first, on the part of the Allies, it was an instinctive reaction in the direction of self-preservation; but, as the struggle progressed, the issues became clearer and clearer and men came to see that it was a struggle to the death between autocracy and democracy. Democracy then grew stronger and stronger in the nations allied against Germany, because of their conscious devotion to its cause in a gigantic struggle and because the implications of autocracy were so clearly seen in the aims and acts of the Central Powers. Germany expected an easy victory, but, after more than four years of terrific struggle, she was subjected to the most humiliating defeat

ever suffered by any nation. With that defeat autocratic government forever perished from the earth. Whatever modifications may take place in the political systems of the earth, one-man power, with imperialistic ambition and militarism, is a thing of the past.

This was also a conflict between egoism and altruism. Germany was saturated with the egoistic philosophy of Nietzsche, or perhaps it would be better to say that the philosophy of Nietzsche was the expression of the egoistic spirit of Germany. And when Germany plunged into the war, she plunged in without regard for the rights of others and without regard for the laws of mercy. The most flagrant breaking of solemn agreements was lightly spoken of as a matter of military necessity and really regarded as perfectly justifiable, because the interests of Germany were being advanced, and the interests of Germany were the only sacred concerns of the egoistic German mind. Savage atrocities that filled the world with horror were openly practiced upon the weak and defenseless. Germany set out to show herself a ruthless, frightful, and merciless

enemy. The atrocities of brutal egoism served to cause the enemies of Germany to resolve to fight to the last man or accomplish her defeat and to bring into the struggle nations that would not otherwise have entered it. It so shocked the world as to create a new sense of value for the principles of altruism. Therefore the Golden Rule now has a vastly larger meaning for the thought of mankind than it has ever had.

But perhaps the greatest victory of the war was the victory of idealism over materialism. This was the most significant and most important victory. Certainly, Germany's aims and Germany's *Kultur* were frankly materialistic. Her idealistic philosophies are discarded. Her civilization, in so far as she had a civilization, was saturated with the materialistic spirit and purpose. But victory over Germany would not necessarily be a victory of idealism over materialism. It might be the victory of one form of materialism over another. The victory came in the discovery by the great majority of persons who were fighting in the great conflict that the superior interests of life are spiritual and

ideal. Men who had been spending their lives in the pursuit of material ends suddenly awoke to the fact that these things would be worthless if the higher values of the soul should suffer negation in the establishment of the law that might makes right. They came suddenly to realize that moral principles and spiritual ends were infinitely precious and that the foundations of material civilization would crumble without them. This realization was beaten in with the blows of a mighty struggle and burned in with the heat of fearful conflict. The great war has been a crucible in which human thought and faith have been refined of much of the dross of both philosophic and practical materialism.

At the beginning of the war the Christian Church was severely censured for not preventing the war. Some object must be found upon which the blame of a general unpreparedness might be imposed, and, in accordance with custom, the church was chosen as that object of blame. The censure had in it an element of justice. It was claimed that, if Christianity had been strong enough

to master the social and political life of the nations, the war would have been impossible. Therefore the failure of Christianity was loudly proclaimed. Now, as a matter of fact, the church had been suffering from a weakness that was common to all the civilization of the time. It had not fully measured up to its responsibility in winning the world to Christian principles. On the other hand, the world had not been fully awake to the importance of being won. That side of the case must never be left outside of a fair judgment of the situation. But the church awoke when the world awoke. Never in the history of religion have the institutions of religion adjusted themselves to the crying needs of humanity as in this great war. Never has the church responded to human need with such whole-hearted abandon. If any institution has ever demonstrated its usefulness and real value to mankind, the institutions of Christianity have done so in their services to men in this world emergency. Christianity has silenced and put to shame those critics who were so eager to announce its failure.

The abiding vitality and adaptability of

religion have been demonstrated. Under the clouds of war people drew nearer to their God. World calamity did not make people less religious but more religious. The consolations of faith were used for support in the time of trouble and uncertainty. Religion was the source of comfort in loss and sorrow. Religion was the staff for the man who must needs go through the valley of the shadow of death. And when victory came men and women went with joy and thanksgiving into their sanctuaries of worship. In the days that are to come, days of readjustment and reconstruction, when broken homes and broken fortunes must be rebuilt, when the conditions of a new order must be established, the chief dynamic of effort will be found to be a real religious faith.

In the process of the war and in meeting the demands of a great opportunity, religion has been revitalized and come into the possession of an enhanced power over the hearts of men. The unimportance of vague theological opinions, of abstruse doctrines, of petty dogmatic differences became strikingly apparent in the face of a great task. Men

that were face to face with death must have a ministry that was fresh and vital and full of the strength of a great faith; and as the representatives of religion went into this ministry they sensed the need of the hour and rose to the occasion. Their hearts were strangely warmed; they stood face to face with eternal realities and were assured; their message and ministry gained such a foundation of certainty as they had never had. Men in the trenches and men facing the serious possibilities of battle felt themselves face to face with eternity and thought things through to a clear faith and an assured sense of the reality of a spiritual order. Their need of religious certainty helped them to find it. They were convinced in a way that men cannot otherwise be convinced. Many a man's skepticism died within him while he stood face to face with God and eternity and the naked souls of men and the meaning of life when stripped of all camouflage and glamour. The attitude of the whole world has been utterly changed. There is a new friendliness toward religious things.

The revitalization of religion has borne

immediate fruit in the church in the undertaking of bigger things for the kingdom of God. The achievements of religious effort under the stress of emergency have awakened the church to a realization of its power when that emergency is passed and when it labors at its regular task. This self-discovery experience is going to have large consequences in the subsequent development of religion.

If war has had a revitalizing influence on religion, it has none the less had a universalizing influence upon both religious and social development. A common cause for many various peoples in a conflict whose outcome was to settle the destiny of the whole world brought a sense of world brotherhood and the essential oneness of humanity. The ends of the earth were brought together in a marvelous way and differences have been swept away in the great tide of sympathy that flooded the thought and feeling of those who fought together for the deliverance of the world from the menace of Prussianism. Perhaps nothing could better illustrate it than the incident of the burial of a Moham-

medan soldier who died fighting for the cause of the Allies. At the head of his grave was placed a cross, the regular instrument for marking the graves of Allied soldiers and the symbol of the Christian religion, and upon the cross was placed a crescent, the symbol of the personal faith of the soldier who was sleeping there. That remarkable combination of emblems marking that grave of a soldier who died for humanity is really emblematic of the kinship of all sincere religious devotion and of the larger understanding and charity that have come to people of various religious faiths. It is not religious division that is now emphasized, but religious unity. And the chief obstacles to the general progress of the race, the clash of clans and the friction of racial differences, come nearer to elimination at the present time than at any previous time in the history of the world.

The task of society for some years to come is the task of reconstruction. This does not mean really material reconstruction. The restoration of desolated and ruined cities and of vast areas of devastated territory and the

establishing of economic order present a big task. But this is not the biggest task that confronts society. We have been struggling in a great conflict to make democracy safe for the world, only to find, when that conflict is ended, a type of democracy manifesting itself that is anything but safe for the world. Bolshevism is the inevitable reaction from despotism. In this great world upheaval it has found its opportunity to demoralize revolutionary movements toward a better political and social order by creating social disorder through its extreme and impracticable demands and methods. Russia, Germany, Austria, and Turkey must be redeemed from social chaos. And in the governments of moderate democracy there are social and industrial conditions that lend justification to the social unrest that is augmented by the contagion of Bolshevism. These things make for the instability of the present social order throughout the world. Society faces the necessity, while it brings order out of chaos in some parts of the world, of readjustment and readaptation in other parts of the world.

The situation would be alarming if we did not keep in mind that human nature is furnished with safety valves and society finds its way through excesses and dangers to progress and a better order of things. A situation of instability is a situation of opportunity. It offers the opportunity to society for righting social wrongs and mending social defects before the social life crystallizes into a settled order from which it will be difficult to shake it again without another violent upheaval. A failure to settle the things that need settling now will be storing up trouble for future generations. While society is disturbed and plastic for remolding, the work of reconstruction in the direction of a practical idealism ought to go as far as possible. A safe idealism for society is the idealism of the New Testament. The aim of the organized forces of the Christian religion should be to get economic, industrial, and political life on New Testament foundations. When that is accomplished the world will be made safe for democracy and democracy safe for the world.

From what has been said in this discussion

of world conflict and reconstruction, it might seem that war has been assumed to be a blessing. This has not been the assumption, and in all our thought of war we must not fall into this fallacy. War is an evil. Whatever benefits may have been derived therefrom, and whatever social progress humanity has been or may be able to make on account of developments issuing out of the war, the fact remains that the price paid for these benefits was a terrible price; and when we consider the enormous wastage of such a struggle we can realize that any progress that may have resulted was indeed costly progress. It is not necessary to assume that war is essential to social progress. The methods and means of peace are less phenomenal but far more satisfactory. All the benefits that came to humanity through the war might have come without the war and without its offsetting calamity and loss. Religion could have been revitalized and would have been. The process might have been a little more gradual but none the less real. It would have had different aspects, of course, but such a revital-

ized religious experience would doubtless have been quite as genuine in its way as the experience of the soldier. Revivals of religion, thorough and genuine, have occurred without the spur of war conditions. The larger democratization of government was a foregone conclusion. The enemies of democracy plunged the world into war to check the evident tendency. All war did was to complicate the situation and to cause the world to pay with the price of blood for better days and better conditions and to clutter the world's constructive operations with the debris of the wrecked and ruined products of the labor of other days. The world has in this sad situation saved what it could from the wreck and made the best of an evil day. The biggest task of reconstruction is, therefore, to eliminate the possibility of world war.

And the war has shown us the method. If this great world war has taught us anything, it has taught us the efficacy of persistent propaganda. The German mind was for years fed on the Pan-German idea. The people were so full of it that it changed their

sense of proportion and altered their standards of value. It changed their emotional dispositions, transformed their ethical ideals, blinded them utterly to any other viewpoint than their own. It was propaganda that accomplished the separate peace with Russia and turned to chaos the Russian revolution. It was propaganda that wrought the Italian debacle and almost wrought the destruction of the Italian nation. The forces opposing Germany learned their lesson and met propaganda with propaganda. Perhaps, after all, the war was won by this method quite as much as by force of arms. After-war revelations have made it apparent that Germany was suffering an internal breaking up while her armies were suffering defeat in the field. It seems certain that Allied propaganda had a great deal to do with that internal breaking up.

There is nothing so effective as eternally dinning an idea into the minds of the people. It is like the continual pounding on a rock that finally breaks it to pieces. This country is now seeing a thing accomplished that a few years ago seemed impossible. The organ-

ized liquor traffic is being swept out of existence. This has been brought about, not by a single great wave of sentiment, but is the result of years of persistent propaganda. Temperance instruction was written into the literature of the Sunday schools, was put into the text-books of the public schools, was scattered broadcast in tracts, disseminated by the press, was preached from the pulpit, was imparted from the lecture platform, until the American mind is so possessed with temperance ideas that the movement is irresistible. It is no longer a matter of sentiment and opinion. It is a matter of fundamental social conviction. It has saturated American thought.

We must thus change the thought of the world concerning war. What has been taught in the school histories of the United States for generations? We have glorified militarism; we have exalted the military hero; we have on every hand given voice to national pride and national egotism. We have made fools of ourselves at this business. We are trying to perpetuate the memory of some things that ought to give us shame that

they ever occurred. One would think that the Civil War was one of the profoundest blessings, so largely has it figured in song and panegyric and so earnestly do we labor to perpetuate its memories by societies and monuments, when, in reality, it was one of the ugliest blunders in the life of any nation, a time when the people of both North and South lost their heads and played the fool. This is drastic, and it requires courage to say it, but we shall be on our way to a real doctrine of peace when we can drop some of the silly sentimentalism of the past and look at things stripped of all their false glamour and as they appear in their real essence to an enlightened understanding. The man of peace, no matter how great his service to the world, has hitherto been passed over for the man of war in matters of honor and reward. This must be changed. The victories of peace must come to outshine the victories of war. War must come to be despised, just as duels and fisticuffs are now the objects of social scorn. We must make our peace propaganda universal that we may give no nation the advantage. We must keep awake to the

use that is being made of this teaching and guard against the thing that almost has made peace sentiments odious to all Americans and to the people of the Allied nations, the prostitution of this high ethical ideal to base and selfish uses.

But what of the men who have gone forth to battle that the world might be made "safe for democracy" and safe for the progress of the kingdom of God? Shall we honor those men? Certainly, we shall honor them as we shall honor all men who have suffered for the world's good. We shall honor them as martyrs. We shall remember them as the victims of evil conditions from which they sought to deliver us. They went forth inspired by the ideal of sacrifice to deliver the world from militarism. The soldier of the Allied armies was not animated by the martial spirit. No one hated war as he hated it. No one knew how to hate it as he knew. He yielded to necessity. He fought to do away with the possibility of another war such as has just afflicted the world. His was a war on war. It is our temptation when our soldiers are coming home victorious, to for-

get the object of their sacrifice, to glory in martial deeds as such and to exalt unconsciously the military ideal. To the extent that we do this, those who have suffered have suffered in vain and those who have died have died in vain.

Religion is destined to have a still larger place in the civilization of the future. The Christian Church stands on the threshold of great opportunities. Perhaps the supreme opportunity of the days immediately to come is the opportunity to offer a ministry of restfulness to a restless world. The world needs a stabilizer. It may be that in the past the church has herself gone too feverishly about her work and has partaken too much of the general restlessness that has pervaded the life of the world. If she is strong enough and can in a large way sense the world's need of this form of ministry, she may serve as the influence that will keep the world sane, soothe its woes, and bring it to the conditions of settled peace. This does not mean that she is to retire from the theater of the world's action and relinquish all aggressive campaigns. It means that she should recognize

that her emphatic task is now to show mankind the blessedness of sitting at the feet of her Christ and finding the serenity of soul that can come only to those who worship God. The church must become pervaded with the atmosphere that will give to the millions the sense of sanctuary.

Religion must not lose out in the matter of the progress of theological thought. There is a danger here. The ultra-conservative sees a great light shining. He will endeavor to discredit many of the achievements of biblical scholarship and all progress in theological thought in recent years by appealing to the general prejudice against all things German and claiming that all that he fails to accept came from German scholars. He will claim that all the new ideas of the last fifty years came from Germany and, because the German cause in the war was unworthy, they are fallacious. A great deal of German theology was materialistic and harmful. The world has suffered from it. But a great deal of it was good and we should give it an honest valuation. We should be guilty of great folly if we

were to cast aside the good things that have come from Germany because of the evil that has come from the same source. We must sift the chaff from the wheat. And we must not confuse the issue nor allow it to be confused. The facts are that all advanced religious thought is not German in origin, not by a great deal, and that a great deal that did come from German scholars is valid because it is true, regardless of any complicity that they may have had in Germany's crimes against civilization. We must never allow prejudice to interfere in the matter of our attitude toward truth. It is to be hoped that the men of the pulpits of to-day and to-morrow will not be driven into intellectual cowardice that will put an end to the progress of the religious thought life and finally dry up the springs of spiritual vitality in this day of unexampled religious opportunity.

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
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